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IN DEFENSE OF SHELBY COUNTY’S PRINCIPLE OF 
EQUAL STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
JEFFREY M. SCHMITT 
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court struck down a key aspect 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 based on “the principle that all States 
enjoy equal sovereignty.”  Legal scholars have exhaustively attacked 
Shelby County’s equal sovereignty principle with a surprising degree of 
unanimity and contempt.  These critics argue that the principle is 
theoretically unworkable, finds no support in the Supreme Court’s 
precedent, is inconsistent with constitutional history, undermines individual 
rights, and is tainted by its association with slavery and Jim Crow. This 
Article responds to such criticism by arguing that the principle of equal 
sovereignty is a coherent and defensible legal doctrine that is deeply rooted 
in our nation’s constitutional history.  Properly understood, the doctrine 
simply ensures that when Congress limits the sovereign power of some of 
the states in ways that do not apply to others, it has a good reason to do so.  
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After nearly a century of state-sponsored disenfranchisement, the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)1 brought meaningful voting rights to millions of 
minority voters for the first time.  The VRA was so successful because, not 
only did it prohibit state discrimination, but it also required states with a 
blatant record of black voter suppression to seek federal approval before 
changing their election laws.2  In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the 
Supreme Court initially upheld this preclearance requirement as necessary 
to address the “exceptional conditions” of widespread disenfranchisement 
in the covered states.3  Nearly fifty years later, however, the Court in Shelby 
County v. Holder changed course and held that the formula used to select 
states for preclearance is unconstitutional.4  Because the formula had not 
been updated to account for “current conditions,”5 the Court stated, 
Congress had not sufficiently justified taking the “extraordinary and 
unprecedented”6 step of violating “the principle that all States enjoy equal 
sovereignty.”7 
Scholars have attacked the equal sovereignty principle with a surprising 
degree of unanimity and contempt.  Constitutional scholars seem to agree 
that the equal sovereignty doctrine has “no basis either in constitutional text 
or in existing constitutional doctrine.”8  The doctrine is also unworkable, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended 
at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1965). 
 4. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 5. Id. at 2629. 
 6. Id. at 2626. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 177 (2013), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-dignity-of-the-south. Judge Richard Posner, for example, 
bluntly states, “[T]here is no doctrine of equal sovereignty.  The opinion rests on air.” Richard 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss2/1
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legal scholars contend, because the federal government routinely treats the 
states unequally.9  Critics further lament that the doctrine undermines 
individual rights by “elevat[ing] concern about the equality and dignity of 
states over the equality and dignity of citizens.”10  Moreover, many scholars 
argue that equal sovereignty “ignores history” by failing to appreciate “how 
the Civil War amendments, including the Fifteenth Amendment, changed 
                                                                                                                 
A. Posner, Supreme Court 2013: The Year in Review: The Voting Rights Act Ruling Is About 
the Conservative Imagination, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_suprem
e_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html; see also Jeremy 
Amar-Dolan, The Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment Standard of Review, 16 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1477, 1488 (2014) (asserting that the equal sovereignty principle was “a 
doctrine which seems to have originated in dicta three years earlier in Northwest Austin”); Jon 
Greenbaum et al., Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes Irrational, 57 HOW. 
L.J. 811, 814-15 (2014) (asserting that the doctrine “had been flatly rejected by the Court in 
Katzenbach as having any relevance and finds no support in constitutional jurisprudence prior 
to 2009”); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 69 (2013) 
(arguing that the principle “led the majority to ignore longstanding precedents”); Franita 
Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1241 (2012) (“[T]he Roberts Court has deferred to state sovereignty in 
ways that are clearly inconsistent with both the constitutional text and history, as well as with 
the Court's own precedent.”); Nina Totenburg, Whose Term Was It? A Look Back at the 
Supreme Court, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 5, 2013, 3:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/ 
198708325/whose-term-was-it-a-look-back-at-the-supreme-court (quoting Michael McConnell 
as asserting that the principle is “made up”). 
 9. See Greenbaum et al., supra note 8, at 849 (arguing that the doctrine is unworkable 
because “Congress has passed a number of laws that treat different states differently, based 
on various factors.”); Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State 
Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 24, 24 (2013), http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/ 
default/files/NYULawReviewOnline-88-1-Price_0.pdf (“A constitutional requirement that 
legislation cannot treat states differently would call into question many typical legislative 
acts.”); Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 379, 436 (2014) (“In reality, Shelby County’s reliance on the principle of 
state equality is a concept that has very little legitimacy, as Congress often enacts legislation 
that treats states differently.”). 
 10. Siegel, supra note 8, at 71; see also Gilda R. Daniels, Unfinished Business: Protecting 
Voting Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928, 1944 (2013) (“[T]he 
states’ rights argument is misguided—it focuses on harm to the state, rather than on harm to 
individual voters.”).  Eric Posner ridicules the doctrine as follows: “Is the idea that when 
Alabama is on the playground with the other states, they’re going to make fun of it because it 
had to ask its mama for permission before going out to play?” Eric Posner, Supreme Court 
2013: The Year in Review: John Roberts’ Opinion on the Voting Rights Act Is Really 
Lame, SLATE (June 25, 2013, 1:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/supreme_court_on_the_voting
_rights_act_chief_justice_john_roberts_struck.html. 
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the state-federal balance of power and the scope of the Tenth 
Amendment.”11  A few scholars even assert that the doctrine is “based on 
the jurisprudence of slavery”12 and “inscribe[s] into the Constitution some 
of the core constitutional claims . . . of the defeated Confederacy and its 
apologists.”13  The legal academy seems to agree with Erwin 
Chemerinsky’s assessment that Shelby County is “among the worst 
decisions in recent times.”14 
This Article provides the first academic defense of Shelby County’s 
principle of equal state sovereignty.15  To summarize, the “principle that all 
States enjoy equal sovereignty” is deeply rooted in constitutional history 
and fully supported by the Court’s precedent.16 Not only is the principle 
therefore older than the Court’s slavery jurisprudence, but it was also 
invoked by abolitionists as well as slavery’s defenders. Moreover, when 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion Of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 713, 732 (2014); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s 
Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 518 (2014) (“It is as if the 
Reconstruction Amendments never happened.”); Fishkin, supra note 8, at 192 (arguing that 
the doctrine is inconsistent with Reconstruction’s “radical transformation of the South 
through federal military and civilian power, with a series of amendments specifically 
ratifying the use of that federal power to establish the equal citizenship of Southern blacks”); 
Joel Heller, Shelby County and the End of History, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 357, 371 (2013) 
(“The Court’s decision in Shelby County largely ignored the story of race and voting that led 
to the enactment of the VRA.”); Siegel, supra note 8, at 71 (arguing that equal sovereignty 
“effaces the history of the Civil War and the Second Reconstruction”); Posner, supra note 10 
(“Roberts is able to cite only the weakest support for this principle . . . . [N]one of the usual 
impressive array of founding authorities show up in his analysis.”). 
 12. James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and 
Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 39, 61 (2014). 
 13. Fishkin, supra note 8, at 192. 
 14. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 262-64 (2014).   
 15. Thomas Colby also defends the equal sovereignty principle in an excellent 
forthcoming article that was written contemporaneously with this.  See Thomas Colby, In 
Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter 
Colby, In Defense].  Colby advances many of the same arguments and reaches many of the 
same conclusions as this Article. Colby provides particularly detailed coverage of the 
supporting precedent and related academic work.  This Article nevertheless raises several 
arguments not mentioned by Colby and often relies on different evidence even when we are 
in agreement. This Article will identify those differences as they arise. 
The only other law review article defending equal sovereignty was written by the lawyers 
who argued the case on behalf of Shelby County.  See William S. Consovoy & Thomas R. 
McCarthy, Shelby County v. Holder: The Restoration of Constitutional Order, 2012-2013 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31. 
 16. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss2/1
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properly limited to equal state sovereignty—rather than equal treatment—
the principle would not invalidate run-of-the-mill federal legislation or 
undermine individual rights. In fact, a proper application of equal 
sovereignty in other contexts, such as the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act and the Clean Air Act, demonstrates that the principle is 
capable of producing defensible results.  The equal sovereignty principle 
simply ensures that when Congress limits the sovereign power of some of 
the states in ways that do not apply to others, it has a good reason to do so. 
Scholars’ unwarranted hostility towards the equal sovereignty principle 
masks the real problem with Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Shelby 
County.  Regardless of whether the equal sovereignty principle can be 
justified as a matter of constitutional law, it did not compel the Court’s 
conclusion that the preclearance formula of the VRA is unconstitutional.  
Statutes that violate the equal sovereignty principle are not necessarily 
invalid; instead, Congress must demonstrate that the statute’s limited 
geographic reach is sufficiently related to the problem the law is addressing.  
Because the record in Shelby County arguably demonstrated more pervasive 
discrimination in the covered jurisdictions than elsewhere, the Court easily 
could have held that Congress had a good reason to limit the sovereignty of 
the covered states. Rather than attacking the existence of the equal 
sovereignty principle, therefore, legal scholars should instead focus on the 
Court’s questionable application of ambiguous constitutional doctrine to 
overturn legislation that was passed with overwhelming political support.17 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides a brief summary of 
the Court’s decision in Shelby County and its doctrine of equal state 
sovereignty.  The remainder of the Article defends the doctrine against the 
major lines of attack advanced by legal scholars.  Part II argues that equal 
sovereignty, when properly understood, is defensible from the standpoint of 
constitutional theory and precedent.  Part III contends the doctrine is 
consistent with constitutional history and is not based on the jurisprudence 
of slavery or Jim Crow. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 17. Such a critique is especially powerful in light of the fact that four of the same 
Justices who joined the Court’s opinion in Shelby County dissented from the Court’s opinion 
in Obergefell because of a perceived lack of deference to the political process.  See 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611-28 (2015). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
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I. Shelby County and the Principle of Equal State Sovereignty 
Although the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, its promise to 
eradicate racial discrimination in voting rights went unrealized for nearly a 
century. White supremacists kept black voters from the polls through a 
combination of discriminatory state legislation, discriminatory application 
of facially neutral state legislation, social and economic pressure, and 
outright violence.18  In the rare instances where discriminatory state policies 
were invalidated, Southern states simply enacted different measures that 
achieved the same discriminatory results “through unremitting and 
ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”19  As late as 1964, white voter 
registration rates exceeded those of African Americans by over fifty percent 
in the Deep South.20   
This all changed when Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.21  
When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the VRA, he called it “one of 
the most monumental laws in the entire history of American freedom.”22  
Section 2 of the VRA prohibits any “prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgment of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”23   
Congress recognized, however, that litigation under section 2 would not 
produce lasting results if states were free to change their election laws.  
Congress’ solution was section 5, which requires any change in the election 
laws of certain states with histories of blatant racial discrimination to be 
approved by a three-judge federal district court in Washington or by the 
U.S. Attorney General.24  
Section 4(b) lists the criteria used to select which jurisdictions are subject 
to federal preclearance. When originally enacted in 1965, the section 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 28-39 (2004). 
 19. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 301 (1966).  The Court’s decision in 
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), striking down grandfather clauses, for 
example, “had no impact on black disfranchisement” because other devices like literacy tests 
and poll taxes could be applied in a discriminatory manner to “nullify black suffrage.”  
KLARMAN, supra note 18, at 85. 
 20. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 11, at 493. 
 21. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended 
at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)). 
 22. Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Lyndon B. Johnson: Remarks in the Capitol 
Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 6, 1965), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27140. 
 23. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 10302(a). 
 24. Id. § 10304(a). 
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captured any state or subdivision that used any “test or device” to determine 
eligibility for voting and had less than fifty percent of the eligible 
population vote in the 1964 election.25  In 1970 and 1975, Congress 
reauthorized section 4(b) using the same coverage formula.26 Any state or 
locality that used any test or device and had less than fifty percent voter 
turnout as of 1964, 1968, or 1972 was therefore covered under section 4(b).  
Congress again reauthorized the VRA in 1982 and, most recently in 2006, 
extending its coverage for an additional twenty-five years.27  Congress, 
however, did not change the selection criteria of section 4(b).  Instead, a 
state or jurisdiction could “bail out” of coverage if certain conditions were 
met, such as a lack of successful section 2 lawsuits brought against it within 
the past ten years.28  As of 2006, each of the covered states—Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, 
and Virginia—was therefore subjected to federal preclearance based on 
data that had not been updated in more than thirty years.29 
In 2006, a local utility district in Texas filed a lawsuit seeking a 
declaration that it was exempt from preclearance under section 4(a) and 
arguing that section 5’s preclearance requirement was unconstitutional.30  
The lower courts rejected the district’s claims on the grounds that only a 
state or political subdivision could take advantage of the VRA’s bailout 
provisions.31  In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. 
Holder (NAMUDNO), however, the Supreme Court reversed and held that a 
utility district is eligible for bailout.32  Although the case was decided on 
narrow statutory grounds, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion asserted that the 
VRA’s preclearance system raised serious constitutional questions.33 The 
Chief Justice asserted that section 5 “imposes substantial ‘federalism 
costs’” because it “differentiates between the States, despite our historic 
tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”34  He further stated 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Id. § 10303(b). 
 26. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400; 52 U.S.C. 
§ 10303(b). 
 27. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(7)-(8). 
 28. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013). 
 29. See id. at 2617.  A number of jurisdictions in North Carolina, California, Florida, 
Michigan, New York, and South Dakota were also covered.  Id. at 2620. 
 30. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 230 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
 31. Id. at 283. 
 32. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009). 
 33. Id. at 204. 
 34. Id. at 202-03 (citation omitted). 
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that “a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty 
requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is 
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”35  Because “[t]hings have 
changed in the South,” the Chief Justice questioned whether the 
preclearance regime remained sufficiently related to voting rights in the 
covered jurisdictions.36  The Court, however, declined to reach the 
applicable standard of review for future challenges to the VRA.37 
After seeing the Court question the constitutionality of the VRA’s 
preclearance regime, Shelby County, Alabama, brought suit seeking a 
declaration that sections 4(b) and 5 were unconstitutional and an injunction 
against their enforcement.38  The lower courts upheld section 5 and found 
that Congress had sufficiently justified the coverage formula of section 4(b) 
because the record demonstrated that discrimination was concentrated in 
those jurisdictions given the number of successful lawsuits brought under 
section 2 and the deterrent effect of section 5.39  In Shelby County, the 
Supreme Court reversed and held section 4(b) unconstitutional.   
The Court began its analysis by stressing that the Constitution preserves 
the sovereignty of the states as an integral component of our system of 
government.  “Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Consti-
tution,” the Court asserted, but “there is also a ‘fundamental principle of 
equal sovereignty’ among the States.”40 The Court stressed that “the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in 
assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”41  More specifically, 
the Court stated that any “disparate geographic coverage” of a law that 
limits state sovereignty “must be ‘sufficiently related to the problem that it 
targets.’”42 
The Court held that “the Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these 
basic principles.”43  According to the Court, federal preclearance was an 
“extraordinary departure from the traditional course of relations between 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. at 203. 
 36. Id. at 202. 
 37. Id. at 204 (“That question has been extensively briefed in this case, but we need not 
resolve it. The Act’s preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise serious 
constitutional questions under either test.”). 
 38. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621-22 (2013). 
 39. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 857-58 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 40. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
 41. Id. at 2624.  
 42. Id. at 2627 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 204).   
 43. Id. at 2624. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss2/1
2016]      IN DEFENSE OF SHELBY COUNTY’S PRINCIPLE 217 
 
 
the States and the Federal Government”44 because “States must beseech the 
Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would 
otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own.”45  As a result, 
“While one State waits months or years and expends funds to implement a 
validly enacted law, its neighbor can typically put the same law into effect 
immediately, through the normal legislative process.”46  Section 4(b) 
therefore violated the equal sovereignty principle. 
Because it violated equal sovereignty, the Court analyzed whether this 
inequality was “sufficiently related” to the problems addressed by the VRA.  
The Court stated that, although the coverage formula was constitutional 
when enacted, “[n]early 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”47  
The Court explained: 
Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated 
practices. The formula captures States by reference to literacy 
tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. But such tests have been banned nationwide for 
over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in the 
covered States have risen dramatically in the years since. Racial 
disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence justifying 
the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. There is no 
longer such a disparity.48 
The Court further emphasized, “Congress—if it is to divide the States—
must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes 
sense in light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past.”49  
The Court thus held that section 4(b) was unconstitutional under the equal 
sovereignty principle because it was not “sufficiently related” to the current 
problem of racial discrimination in voting.   
The Court, however, did not clearly indicate how the equal sovereignty 
principle should apply in future cases.50  Under Shelby County, any 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at 2631 (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 500-01 (1992)).  
 45. Id. at 2624. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 2625. 
 48. Id. at 2627-28 (internal citations omitted). 
 49. Id. at 2629. 
 50. See Amar-Dolan, supra note 8, at 1479 (“In its decision in Shelby County, however, 
the Court avoided the question of the standard of review applicable to Fifteenth Amendment 
legislation.”); Tolson, supra note 9, at 387 (“Shelby County . . . provided little guidance 
regarding the appropriate standard of review . . . .”). Colby does not attempt to pinpoint the 
standard of review used in the doctrine. 
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“disparate geographic coverage” of a law that limits state sovereignty “must 
be ‘sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.’”51  But what exactly 
does this mean?  At some points in the opinion, the Court uses language 
that suggests Congress needs only a rational basis to pass a law that 
unequally limits state sovereignty.52  Some scholars, however, contend that, 
because Congress had a rational basis to renew section 4(b), the Court 
actually applied heightened scrutiny.53   
As in NAMUNDO, Chief Justice Roberts probably meant to reserve the 
standard-of-review issue for another day.  Shelby County’s “sufficiently 
related to” language does not correspond to any known standard of review.  
Moreover, City of Boerne v. Flores,54 which announced the “congruence 
and proportionality” standard for the Fourteenth Amendment, is not even 
cited in the Court’s opinion.  As Richard Hasen contends, “[I]t is 
impossible to believe” that the Chief Justice’s failure to identify the 
appropriate standard of review “was an oversight.”55   
To avoid deciding the standard-of-review issue, Chief Justice Roberts 
must have thought that, as he suggested in NAMUNDO, “[t]he Act’s 
preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise serious 
constitutional questions under either test.”56  The equal sovereignty doctrine 
allowed the Court to reach this conclusion. The Court found that, because 
the VRA violated the equal sovereignty doctrine, Congress needed a 
rational basis, not just for preclearance, but also for drawing distinctions 
between the covered states and the rest of the country.57  The Court held 
that, because the section 4(b) formula was based on outdated data,58 
Congress had not given a rational basis for selecting the covered states for a 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009)).   
 52. See, e.g., id. at 2630-31 (“It would have been irrational for Congress to distinguish 
between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-year-old data . . . .”).   
 53. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 11, at 513; Jon Greenbaum et al., supra 
note 8, at, 840-43; Samuel Spital, A Doctrine of Sameness, Not Federalism:  How the 
Supreme Court’s Application of “Equal Sovereignty” Principle in Shelby County v. Holder 
Undermines Core Constitutional Values, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 561, 577 (2014). 
 54. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 55. Hasen, supra note 11, at 727. 
 56. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 204. 
 57. Congress clearly had a rational basis to think that preclearance would prevent 
discrimination in voting.  And, under rational basis review, the government “may take one 
step at a time” and leave the rest of the problem for another day. See Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Without the equal sovereignty principle in 
play, therefore, preclearance should have survived rational basis review.   
 58. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625 (2013). 
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preclearance regime that interfered with their sovereign power to pass new 
election laws.  By failing to clearly identify the standard of review, 
however, the Court left the door open to announce in the future that laws 
violating equal sovereignty should be subjected to heightened scrutiny. 
II. Constitutional Theory, Doctrine, and Policy 
Scholars have vigorously attacked the equal sovereignty doctrine as 
theoretically unworkable, unsupported by constitutional text or precedent, 
and undesirable as a matter of policy.  This Section responds to each of 
these criticisms in turn.   
A. Theory 
In her dissenting opinion in Shelby County, Justice Ginsburg pointed out 
that “[f]ederal statutes that treat States disparately are hardly novelties.”59  
In support, she provided the following string citation: 
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (no State may operate or permit a 
sports-related gambling scheme, unless that State conducted 
such a scheme “at any time during the period beginning January 
1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990”); . . . 42 U.S.C. § 3796bb 
(at least 50 percent of rural drug enforcement assistance funding 
must be allocated to States with “a population density of fifty-
two or fewer persons per square mile or a State in which the 
largest county has fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand 
people, based on the decennial census of 1990 through fiscal 
year 1997”); §§ 13925, 13971 (similar population criteria for 
funding to combat rural domestic violence); § 10136 (specifying 
rules applicable to Nevada’s Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site, 
and providing that “[n]o State, other than the State of Nevada, 
may receive financial assistance under this subsection after 
December 22, 1987”).60 
Justice Ginsburg then asked, “Do such provisions remain safe given the 
Court’s expansion of equal sovereignty’s sway?”61 Many legal scholars 
have accepted this argument at face value.62  Erwin Chemerinsky, for 
example, asserts that the equal sovereignty principle is unworkable because 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. See sources cited supra note 7. 
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“if such a constitutional rule exists, countless federal laws, especially 
spending programs, are constitutionally vulnerable, because they treat some 
states differently from others.”63 
Of course, the federal government treats the states differently all the 
time.  When the federal government provides funding for Medicaid, for 
example, Florida receives more than Utah.64  And when Congress spends 
money on the military, states with large military installations and 
production facilities, such as Virginia, get a larger economic boost than 
other states, like Rhode Island, that lack such facilities.65  In fact, given the 
size of California’s population and economy, most federal legislation has a 
disproportionately larger effect in that state. Any constitutional principle 
that limits the federal government’s ability to treat the states differently 
would seriously undermine federal power. 
The equal sovereignty principle, however, does not require the federal 
government to treat the states equally.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines the 
term “sovereignty” as “[s]upreme dominion, authority, or rule” or “the 
supreme political authority of an independent state.”66 The Court in Shelby 
County clearly had this definition in mind.  When justifying the equal 
sovereignty principle, the Court explained that “States retain broad 
autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative 
objectives.”67  The Court further stated that “our Nation ‘was and is a union 
of States, equal in power, dignity and authority.’”68  Rather than requiring 
the federal government to treat the states equally, the equal sovereignty 
principle means only that the states should be equal in political authority.  
Stated another way, the equal sovereignty principle is violated only when 
Congress limits the political power of a state in way that does not apply to 
all other states.   
                                                                                                                 
 63. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 262. 
 64. Not only does Florida receive more money due to its larger population, but the 
median age of Floridians is much higher than citizens of Utah. See Median Age, by State, 
USA TODAY (June 10, 2010, 6:16 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/ 
census/median-age-by-state.htm.  
 65. See Robert Levinson et al., Bloomberg Government Study:  Impact of Defense 
Spending: A State by State Study, BLOOMBERG GOV’T (Nov. 17, 2011), at 1, 51, 58, http:// 
www.ct.gov/ecd/Lib/ecd/futures/6._bloomberg_defense_spending.pdf. 
 66. Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  Furthermore, “state 
sovereignty” is defined as “[t]he right of a STATE to self-government; the supreme authority 
exercised by each STATE.” State Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 67. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013). 
 68. Id. (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911)). 
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Most of the examples cited by Justice Ginsburg and Chemerinsky are 
therefore inapposite.  When the federal government decides to locate a 
federal building in one state, it neither advances nor inhibits that state’s 
political power.  Similarly, when Congress appropriates funds to the states 
for Medicaid based on the number of low-income and elderly residents in 
each state, it does not limit or enhance any state’s political power.  
Although California’s power has been enhanced as a practical matter, 
because the federal funds can be used to further California’s regulatory 
goals, the money does not actually increase California’s sovereign power to 
regulate.  In other words, the scope of regulations that California could 
enact—its formal legal power—is not affected by federal appropriations.  
Properly conceived, the equal sovereignty principle applies to very few 
federal statutes. 
The Supreme Court’s other federalism jurisprudence helps to ensure that 
Congress will pass few such laws.  In New York v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress cannot commandeer a state legislature 
and force a state to pass legislation.69  Because a federal law that 
commandeered the state legislature would necessarily limit the sovereign 
power of that state, any commandeering law that operated unequally among 
the states would violate the equal sovereignty principle.  New York, 
however, eliminates this concern by prohibiting all commandeering.  The 
Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius similarly 
held that Congress cannot impose coercive conditions on federal funds 
given to the states.70  As a result of these cases, Congress cannot use its 
enumerated powers to single out any particular state and limit its sovereign 
power to regulate internal affairs by forcing the state to enact any particular 
regulation. 
The only category of federal legislation that violates the equal 
sovereignty principle, therefore, is legislation that prohibits some states—
but not others—from passing certain types of regulations.  Such federal 
laws are exceedingly rare.  Of course, sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA fall 
into this category, as they limit a group of southern states’ ability to 
                                                                                                                 
 69. 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).  In New York, the Court struck down a federal statute that 
forced the states to take title to nuclear waste or indemnify private actors for any damages 
arising from the possession of nuclear waste.  Id. at 188. 
 70. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607-08 (2012).  In Sebelius, the Court held that Congress could 
not condition all of a state’s federal funding for Medicaid on the state’s expansion of 
Medicaid to previously ineligible individuals. Id.  Because federal funding for Medicaid 
amounted to approximately twenty percent of the average state’s budget, the Court found 
that the states did not have a meaningful choice.  Id. at 2604. 
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regulate elections. Other statutes include the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which permits only Nevada to legalize 
sports betting,71 and the Clean Air Act, which permits only California to 
regulate fuels and motor vehicle construction.72  These statutes violate the 
equal sovereignty principle by limiting the sovereign power of only forty-
nine states.  Stated differently, Congress has given Nevada and California 
the power to enact regulations that the other states cannot pass, thereby 
resulting in unequal sovereignty.73  Because the equal sovereignty principle, 
when properly understood, would apply to relatively few federal statutes, 
the popular criticism that it would invalidate too much federal legislation is 
misplaced.74 
B. Text and Precedent 
Constitutional law scholars also seem to agree that the equal sovereignty 
principle has “no basis either in constitutional text or in existing 
constitutional doctrine.”75  These scholars, however, have again greatly 
exaggerated the argument against equal sovereignty.  Although the 
principle of equal state sovereignty is not explicitly stated in the 
Constitution’s text or required by the holding of any preexisting case, it is 
entirely consistent with, and perhaps even supported by, both sources. 
First, scholars should not expect the text of the Constitution to include an 
explicit acknowledgement of the equal sovereignty principle.76  In the 
                                                                                                                 
 71. 28 U.S.C § 3704 (2012); see also Joshua Winneker et al., Sports Gambling and the 
Expanded Sovereignty Doctrine, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 38, 38-39 (2013). 
 72. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2012); see also Valerie J. M. Brader, 
Congress' Pet: Why the Clean Air Act's Favoritism of California Is Unconstitutional Under 
the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 119, 119 (2007). 
 73. See supra Part II.D (discussing these statutes in more detail). 
 74. Other examples include the Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 
Stat. 2681-719 (1998), and 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5) (2000) (exempting Hawaii from the full 
scope of ERISA preemption).  While such statutes do exist, the equal sovereignty doctrine 
would not cripple the federal government, as its critics seem to maintain. 
 75. Fishkin, supra note 8, at 177; see also, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 6, at 846-47 
(“[N]othing in the text of the Constitution suggests, let alone dictates, that the federal 
government must treat states equally in legislative enactments.”); Spital, supra note 53, at 
562 (“Shelby County represents a radical departure from precedent.”); sources cited supra 
note 11. 
 76. Relying on the “equal treatment” provisions discussed below, Price argues that the 
text “implies the absence of a general principle of state equality by mandating some forms of 
equal treatment but not others.”  Price, supra note 9, at 27.  He further asserts that “the 
specificity of guarantees such as the Tax Uniformity Clause and the Port Preference Clause 
suggests that no general rule otherwise guards states against unequal treatment in federal 
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Constitution, the people delegated power to the federal government and 
imposed some limitations on state power.  The Constitution, therefore, does 
not create the states or grant them their sovereign power.  As Hamilton 
asserted in Federalist No. 32, after Ratification, “The State governments 
would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, 
and which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United 
States.”77  Because the states existed prior to Ratification, it is not 
surprising that the framers omitted any mention of equal state sovereignty.  
Moreover, as discussed below, the very structure of the text supports the 
equal sovereignty of the states. 
Second, while a number of clauses require equal treatment,78 several 
provisions also implicitly recognize the equal sovereignty of the states.  
                                                                                                                 
legislation.”  Id. at 28. Price therefore is invoking the canon of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, which means, “[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the 
other . . . .”  Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
Price’s argument makes sense, however, only because he incorrectly posits that the equal 
sovereignty principle requires Congress to treat the states equally.  It is true that the 
Uniformity and Port Preference Clauses command Congress to treat the states equally.  
These clauses, however, do not require Congress to respect the equal sovereignty of the 
states.  For example, although a law imposing a higher tax on goods exported from New 
York than other states would violate an equal treatment rule, such a federal law would not 
implicate the sovereign power of New York.  Price’s canon of construction— to express or 
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other—is therefore inapplicable. 
 77. THE FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS: DEBATES THAT MADE AMERICA 72 
(Createspace Independent Pub., 2010) (Federalist 32). 
 78. The Uniformity Clause provides that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  According to the Supreme 
Court, “There was concern that the National Government would use its power over 
commerce to the disadvantage of particular States.”  United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 
81 (1983).  As Justice Story explained in his Commentaries on the Constitution, the 
Uniformity Clause was therefore designed “to cut off all undue preferences of one state over 
another in the regulation of subjects affecting their common interests.” Id. (quoting 1 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 479 (Thomas M. 
Cooley ed., 1873)).  Other provisions serve the same purpose.  Section 9, Clause 4, which 
prohibits direct taxes unless in proportion to the Census, prevents Congress from taxing the 
people of one state more than the people of another.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Moreover, 
Section 9, Clause 5 states “[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any 
State.”  Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.  And finally, Section 9, Clause 6 prohibits Congress from giving 
preference “to the Ports of one State over those of another.”  Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.  Each of 
these provisions seeks to preserve the equality of the states by preventing Congress from 
disproportionately burdening any particular state. 
Moreover, Professor Colby has advanced a sophisticated argument for imputing a uniformity 
requirement into the Commerce Clause.  See Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten 
Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249 (2005).  Colby asserts 
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Article IV’s Full Faith and Credit Clause requires each state to give equal 
respect to the “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every 
other State.”79  This Clause, therefore, recognizes the equal sovereign 
power of each state to decide cases and regulate conduct within its 
jurisdiction.80 Article I also recognizes equal sovereignty by providing for 
equal representation in the Senate,81 the one branch of government where 
the states played a role in creating national law.82  Similarly, Articles V and 
VII give each state equal say in the ratification of the Constitution and its 
amendments.83  Scholars have also argued that the framers intended for the 
Guarantee Clause of Article IV to prohibit federal interference with state 
sovereignty over local affairs.84 And, although the Constitution does contain 
several limitations on state sovereignty,85 these provisions equally limit the 
sovereign power of each state.  In sum, although the equal sovereignty 
doctrine is not explicitly stated in the text, the Constitution arguably 
operates with equal sovereignty as a background assumption.  
Even if it is consistent with the text, critics still insist the Court created 
the equal sovereignty principle from whole cloth in NAMUNDO and Shelby 
County.  In her dissenting opinion in Shelby County, Justice Ginsburg 
contends that the precedent relied on by the Court narrowly holds only that 
                                                                                                                 
that the framers viewed these powers as interconnected and that the text omits a uniformity 
requirement only because of a last minute change from the Committee of Style that was not 
meant to change the meaning of the text.  Id. at 275-76. Colby contends that, because the 
scope of Congress’s commerce power has expanded dramatically, the scope of the 
uniformity requirement should be expanded as well.  Id. at 312. 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 80. See generally Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and 
Credit, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485 (2013). 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 314 (James Madison) 
(Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“[T]he equal vote allowed to each State [in the Senate] is at once a 
constitutional recognition of the portion of the sovereignty remaining in the individual 
States . . . .”). 
 82. State equality is further reinforced by the fact that, prior to the Seventeenth 
Amendment, senators were chosen directly by the state governments.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVII. Unequal representation in the House does not undermine this point, since the House 
was seen as the voice of the people rather than the states.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, 
supra note 81, at 314 (Madison) (“No law or resolution can now be passed without the 
concurrence, first, of a majority of the people [in the House], and then, of a majority of the 
States [in the Senate.]”).   
 83. U.S. CONST. arts. V, VII. 
 84. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:  Federalism 
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988); see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM:  
A DIALOGUE 111 (1995). 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
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Congress cannot limit the sovereignty of a state as a condition of its 
admission to the Union.86  Justice Ginsburg further asserts that, not only is 
the equal sovereignty principle unsupported by precedent, but that its 
application beyond the context of the admission of new states is “in flat 
contradiction with Katzenbach.”87  Legal scholars agree with Justice 
Ginsburg’s assessment wholeheartedly.88   
Despite this consensus, the cases cited by the majority are entirely 
consistent with the equal sovereignty principle.89  Justice Ginsburg is 
correct to say that, other than Katzenbach, the precedent cited by the 
majority involves limits on state sovereignty that Congress attempted to 
place on states as a condition of admission to the Union.  The narrow 
holdings of these cases thus arguably support her interpretation. The 
language and reasoning actually used in these cases, however, strongly 
supports Shelby County’s broader application.   
Pollard v. Hagan is the earliest case cited by the Court in Shelby 
County.90 Pollard arose from a dispute over land in Alabama that was 
situated within the tidal zone of the Mobile River.91  The plaintiff in Pollard 
sought to eject the defendant based on a grant of title from Congress made 
in 1836.92  The federal government’s power to dispose of the land was in 
turn derived from Georgia, which had ceded its claims to present-day 
Alabama in 1802 for the purpose of creating a new state.93  The Court 
ultimately held that, although Congress had authority while Alabama was a 
territory,94 Congress lost this power when Alabama became a state in 1819.   
The Pollard Court based its decision on what has become known as the 
“equal footing doctrine.”  The Court explained, “When Alabama was 
admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 8, at 70 (“[E]arlier cases on the Reconstruction 
Amendments described this principle as limited to controlling admission of states to the 
Union . . . .”); see also other sources cited supra note 6. 
 89. Colby’s forthcoming work and this Article are also largely in agreement with 
respect to the import of precedent. One difference of note, however, is that while Colby does 
not stake out a position on whether Shelby County is consistent with Katzenbach, see Colby, 
In Defense, supra note 15, at note 159, this Article provides an argument for reading the two 
cases together.   
 90. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
 91. Id. at 219-20. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 222. 
 94. Id. at 222-23; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain 
which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession . . . .”95  The Court 
reasoned that, at the time of the Revolution, the sovereign power of the 
states included “the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils 
under them for their own common use . . . .”96 Because Alabama inherited 
such sovereign power when it became a state, Congress’s attempt to convey 
the land after Alabama’s statehood was void.97 
For the Court in Pollard, the “equal footing doctrine” went hand in hand 
with a basic principle of equal state sovereignty.  The Court explained as 
follows: 
Alabama is . . . entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over 
all the territory within her limits, subject to the common law, to 
the same extent that Georgia possessed it before she ceded it to 
the United States.  To maintain any other doctrine, is to deny that 
Alabama has been admitted into the union on an equal footing 
with the original states . . . .98 
The Court applied Pollard’s equal footing doctrine in a number of 
subsequent decisions.  In Withers v. Buckley,99 the Court used the equal 
footing doctrine to uphold a Mississippi law that provided for the 
development of canals that changed the course of rivers within the state.100  
The plaintiff, who lost use of the river as a result, brought suit claiming the 
state law conflicted with the federal law providing for Mississippi’s 
admission as a state.101  This federal law stipulated that “the Mississippi 
river, and the navigable rivers leading into the same, shall be common 
highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of Mississippi as to 
other citizens of the United States.”102  The Court ultimately held that the 
federal law “could have no effect to restrict the new State in any of its 
necessary attributes as an independent sovereign Government, nor to inhibit 
or diminish its perfect equality with the other members of the Confederacy 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added). The Court similarly stated, “The right of 
Alabama and every other new state to exercise all the powers of government, which belong 
to and may be exercised by the original states of the union, must be admitted, and remain 
unquestioned . . . .” Id. at 224. 
 96. Id. at 229.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 228-29 (emphasis added). 
 99. Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1857). 
 100. Id. at 87-88. 
 101. Id. at 88. 
 102. Id. 
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with which it was to be associated.”103  The Court therefore upheld the 
Mississippi internal improvement law on the basis that Congress lacked the 
power to place restrictions on the sovereign power of Mississippi that were 
not applicable to other states.  The Court asserted that its “conclusions 
follow from the very nature and objects of the Confederacy, from the 
language of the Constitution adopted by the States, and from the rule of 
interpretation pronounced by this court in the case of Pollard’s Lessee v. 
Hogan.”104  In this passage, the Court is arguably indicating that the 
Constitution requires all of the states—new and old alike—to have equal 
sovereignty so that they can fulfill their roles in our federalist system. 
Escanaba & Lake Michigan Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago105 presented 
the Court with a nearly identical issue.  The plaintiff sought to enjoin the 
City of Chicago’s regulation of drawbridges based on the federal legislation 
admitting Illinois as a state.106  This federal law included a requirement that 
“[t]he navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and 
the carrying places between them, shall be common highways and forever 
free . . . .”107  The Court upheld the Chicago regulation by reasoning that 
“[o]n [Illinois’] admission she at once became entitled to and possessed of 
all the rights of dominion and sovereignty which belonged to the original 
states. She was admitted, and could be admitted, only on the same footing 
with them.”108  The Court further stated, “Equality of constitutional right 
and power is the condition of all the States of the Union, old and new.”109  
Although the Court again struck down federal limitations imposed prior to 
statehood, it strongly implied that the doctrine was based on a more 
fundamental principle of equal state power.   
Ward v. Race Horse also acknowledges the equal sovereignty of the 
states.110  Prior to the admission of Wyoming, the United States entered into 
a treaty that guaranteed hunting rights to the Bannock Indians.111  The Court 
held that “the [hunting] privilege conferred and the act of admission [of 
Wyoming as a state], are irreconcilable in the sense that the two under no 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 92. 
 104. Id. (citation omitted). 
 105. 107 U.S. 678 (1883). 
 106. Id. at 682.  
 107. Id. at 688. 
 108. Id. at 688-89. 
 109. Id. at 689. 
 110. 163 U.S. 504, 507 (1896). 
 111. Id. at 507-08. 
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reasonable hypothesis can be construed as coexisting.”112  The Court 
reasoned as follows: 
The power of all the States to regulate the killing of game within 
their borders will not be gainsaid, yet, if the treaty applies to the 
unoccupied land of the United States in the State of Wyoming, 
that State would be bereft of such power, since every isolated 
piece of land belonging to the United States as a private owner, 
so long as it continued to be unoccupied land, would be exempt 
in this regard from the authority of the State. Wyoming, then, 
will have been admitted into the Union, not as an equal member, 
but as one shorn of a legislative power vested in all the other 
States of the Union, a power resulting from the fact of statehood 
and incident to its plenary existence.113 
The Court continued to explain that Wyoming could not be “stripped by 
implication and deduction of an essential attribute of its governmental 
existence.”114  Essentially, the Court held that, after statehood, Wyoming’s 
sovereign power to regulate its own territory must be equal to that of all 
other states. 
The connection between the equal footing doctrine and the principle of 
equal state sovereignty was made most explicit in Coyle v. Smith.115  In 
Coyle, the plaintiff argued that an Oklahoma act moving the state capital 
conflicted with Congress’s enabling act, which specifically required the 
state to locate its capital in Guthrie until 1913 and prohibited the state from 
funding the construction of buildings in any new capital city.116  The Court 
held that the federal restriction on Oklahoma’s sovereign power to move its 
capital violated the equal footing doctrine and therefore upheld the 
Oklahoma law.117 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. at 514. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 516. 
 115. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).  Long before Shelby County was decided, Shapiro asserted 
that, in Coyle, “The Court stressed the importance of equality among the states . . . .”  
SHAPIRO, supra note 84, at 65.  He further contended that “Coyle fairly stands for the 
proposition that distinctions among states (and not merely those relating to terms of 
admission) must be warranted by a clear grant of congressional authority and by an adequate 
basis for the distinctions drawn.”  Id.   
 116. Coyle, 221 U.S. at 563. 
 117. Id. at 579. 
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The Court in Coyle justified its application of the equal footing doctrine 
with the need to preserve the equal sovereignty of the states.  The Court 
explained as follows: 
“This Union” was and is a union of States, equal in power, 
dignity, and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of 
sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution itself. To maintain otherwise would be to say that 
the Union, through the power of Congress to admit new States, 
might come to be a union of States unequal in power, as 
including States whose powers were restricted only by the 
Constitution, with others whose powers had been further 
restricted by an act of Congress accepted as a condition of 
admission. Thus it would result, first, that the powers of 
Congress would not be defined by the Constitution alone, but in 
respect to new States, enlarged or restricted by the conditions 
imposed upon new States by its own legislation admitting them 
into the Union; and, second, that such new States might not 
exercise all of the powers which had not been delegated by the 
Constitution, but only such as had not been further bargained 
away as conditions of admission.118 
For the Court, a union of states that possessed unequal power was 
unthinkable.  The Court concluded its opinion by stating, “To this we may 
add that the constitutional equality of the States is essential to the 
harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was 
organized. When that equality disappears we may remain a free people, but 
the Union will not be the Union of the Constitution.”119  Although scholars 
cite cases like Coyle as narrowly holding only that Congress cannot 
permanently limit the sovereignty of a state as a condition of admission, the 
Court’s reasoning clearly applies beyond the context of the admission of 
new states. 
Even if precedent such as Coyle supports equal sovereignty, many 
scholars nevertheless vigorously assert that Katzenbach rejected the 
principle.120  There is no doubt that equal sovereignty was squarely at issue 
in the case, as South Carolina argued that the VRA was unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 567. 
 119. Id. at 580. 
 120. See, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 814-15 (asserting that the doctrine “had been 
flatly rejected by the Court in Katzenbach as having any relevance”). 
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because preclearance violated the equal sovereignty of the states.121  The 
Court rejected this argument, however, stating, “The doctrine of the 
equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, 
for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to 
the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently 
appeared.”122  According to Justice Ginsburg and others, this passage means 
that the equal sovereignty principle does not apply to Congressional 
legislation passed after a state’s admission to the Union.123 
Although Katzenbach can plausibly be interpreted as rejecting the equal 
sovereignty principle, another interpretation is equally plausible. 
Katzenbach holds that the equal sovereignty principle does not apply to 
“remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”124  Rather 
than cabin the principle to the admission of new states, this language could 
simply mean that Congress may violate the equal sovereignty principle 
when needed to address local problems within particular states.  Such an 
interpretation is perfectly consistent with the doctrine announced in Shelby 
County:  Congress may unequally limit state sovereignty when doing so is 
“sufficiently related” to the problem it is addressing.  Under such a reading, 
Katzenbach does not foreclose expansion of Coyle’s equal footing doctrine 
to legislation passed after a state’s admission.125 
In fact, Katzenbach’s actual discussion of the VRA’s preclearance 
regime reads as though the Court was applying the equal sovereignty 
principle.  The Court began by recognizing that limiting the sovereignty of 
the covered states was “an uncommon exercise of congressional 
power . . . .”126  The Court found, however, that “exceptional conditions can 
justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”127  Here, the Court 
arguably implies that a law that violates the equal sovereignty of the states 
must be justified by “exceptional conditions” (or have a sufficient 
relationship to Congress’s goal). 
Shelby County’s critics have exaggerated the case against the equal 
sovereignty principle based on this precedent.  Although the equal footing 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328-29. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See supra notes 87-88. 
 124. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added). 
 125. Admittedly, the Court states that the equality doctrine applies “only” to the 
admission of new states; however, this is a fair characterization of the precedent and need 
not foreclose future application of the doctrine in different contexts. See id. at 328-29. 
 126. Id. at 334. 
 127. Id.  
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cases do not directly apply outside the context of the admission of new 
states, their rationale and language support a broader application.  
Moreover, Katzenbach does not foreclose such a result, as the language 
used in Katzenbach is ambiguous and the Court’s analysis of the coverage 
formula reads as though the Court were applying the equal sovereignty 
principle. 
C. Policy 
Scholars further contend the equal sovereignty doctrine is indefensible as 
a matter of policy.  Perhaps the most powerful normative critique of the 
principle is that, as Reva Siegel asserts, it “elevates concern about the 
equality and dignity of states over the equality and dignity of citizens.”128  
Siegel accuses the Court of applying the equal sovereignty principle only 
because it “was more concerned about the ‘disparate treatment’ that civil 
rights law inflicts on states than the disparate treatment that discrimination 
inflicts on citizens.”129   
In one sense, Siegel’s comparison between individual rights and the 
equal sovereignty principle makes sense.  Just as the courts apply 
heightened scrutiny to regulations that violate individual rights, the 
principle imposes scrutiny on any federal law that imposes unequal limits 
on state sovereignty.  Stated simply, Congress must have a sufficient 
justification when it violates a fundamental individual right or limits the 
sovereign power of the states unequally.  The principle essentially makes 
sovereignty a fundamental state right in the same way that privacy is a 
fundamental individual right. 
The equal sovereignty principle, however, need not trump individual 
rights.130 The Court in Shelby County makes this very point when it 
explains why Katzenbach was correct at the time it was decided.  Even 
though the VRA violated the equal sovereignty principle from the moment 
it was enacted, the Court in Shelby County found that, at the time 
Katzenbach was decided, the VRA was sufficiently “justified to address 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Siegel, supra note 8, at 71; see also Daniels, supra note 10, at 1944. 
 129. Siegel, supra note 8, at 69 (citation omitted). 
 130. Colby and this Article agree that the equal sovereignty principle is defensible from a 
policy standpoint. See Colby, In Defense, supra note 15. Only this Article, however, directly 
tackles the argument, raised by Siegel and others, that equal sovereignty elevates states’ 
rights over individual rights. See Siegel, supra note 8; see also sources cited supra note 8. 
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‘voting discrimination where it persist[ed] on a pervasive scale.’”131  The 
Court explains,  
We therefore concluded [in Katzenbach] that “the coverage 
formula was rational in both practice and theory.” It accurately 
reflected those jurisdictions uniquely characterized by voting 
discrimination “on a pervasive scale,” linking coverage to the 
devices used to effectuate discrimination and to the resulting 
disenfranchisement. The formula ensured that the “stringent 
remedies [were] aimed at areas where voting discrimination 
ha[d] been most flagrant.”132 
Katzenbach—which was reaffirmed on its facts in Shelby County—
demonstrates that Congress may violate the equal sovereignty principle 
when doing so is “sufficiently related” to the protection of individual rights.  
In fact, the Court in Shelby County struck down section 4(b)—the VRA’s 
coverage formula—rather than section 5’s preclearance requirement. 
“Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions,”133 even 
though doing so would clearly still violate the equal sovereignty principle.  
Accordingly, Congress can violate the principle whenever doing so is 
sufficiently related to the protection of individual rights.  
Even though the equal sovereignty of the states does not trump 
individual rights, Shelby County’s critics might still complain that, at least 
on the facts of that case, the Court invalidated a statute that protected 
individual rights based on state-sovereignty concerns.  This result, however, 
is not due to any flaw in the content of the equal sovereignty principle.  In 
theory, the equal sovereignty principle could just as easily be used to 
protect as to undermine individual rights.  In Shelby County, the principle 
undermined a federal law that made it more difficult for certain states to 
pass laws that undermine the voting rights of minorities.  But the principle 
would equally apply to a hypothetical federal law that, for example, 
imposed voter ID requirements on most states but left the states in the Deep 
South free to experiment with new voting requirements.  The principle 
would also make it more difficult for Congress to grant exceptions to 
federal legislation that protects the rights of employees, the environment, 
and countless other federal laws favored by most legal academics.  For 
example, just as the Clean Air Act allows California to regulate certain 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013) (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
at 308). 
 132. Id. at 2625 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308). 
 133. Id. at 2631. 
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activities that are off limits to the other states, any congressional attempt to 
provide similar exceptions to states such as Alaska or Texas to enable more 
pollution would equally violate equal sovereignty.  The equal sovereignty 
principle is therefore neutral from a policy standpoint—it applies to statutes 
based on the manner in which they apply to the states rather than their 
content.134  
Moreover, the equal sovereignty principle did not compel the Court to 
strike down section 4(b) of the VRA. As explained above, the Court in 
Shelby County held that section 4(b) was no longer sufficiently related to 
the protection of voting rights because “the conditions that originally 
justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered 
jurisdictions.”135 In other words, the Court held that section 4(b)’s coverage 
formula was not sufficiently related to the protection of individual rights in 
2013.  As Justice Ginsburg made abundantly clear in her dissent, however, 
the Court easily could have concluded otherwise. Justice Ginsburg 
summarized evidence supporting the coverage formula as follows: 
The coverage provision identified a known list of places with an 
undisputed history of serious problems with racial discrimination 
in voting . . . . There was extensive evidence that, due to the 
preclearance mechanism, conditions in the covered jurisdictions 
had notably improved. And there was evidence that preclearance 
was still having a substantial real-world effect, having stopped 
hundreds of discriminatory voting changes in the covered 
jurisdictions since the last reauthorization. In addition, there was 
evidence that racial polarization in voting was higher in covered 
jurisdictions than elsewhere, increasing the vulnerability of 
minority citizens in those jurisdictions. And countless witnesses, 
reports, and case studies documented continuing problems with 
voting discrimination in those jurisdictions.136 
Although she does not recognize the legitimacy of the equal sovereignty 
principle, the evidence Justice Ginsburg presents arguably demonstrates 
that singling out the states captured by section 4(b) was “sufficiently 
                                                                                                                 
 134. The same could be said for New York and Printz.  Although many scholars dislike 
the anti-commandeering principle, it was used (perhaps unintentionally) in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842), to undermine the Fugitive Slave Act. See, e.g., Paul 
Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Antislavery Use of a 
Proslavery Decision, 25 CIV. WAR HISTORY 5 (1979). 
 135. Shelby Cty, 133 S. Ct. at 2618. 
 136. Id. at 2651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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related” to the need to protect voting rights.  Rather than attacking the 
substance of the equal sovereignty principle, Shelby County’s critics 
therefore should focus on the Court’s questionable application of the 
principle to reach an unpopular result.   
D. Other Applications: PASPA and the Clean Air Act 
Providing a balanced account of Shelby County is important because the 
equal sovereignty principle is potentially applicable outside the context of 
voting rights.137  This Part provides a brief background of two federal 
statutes—the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) and 
the Clean Air Act—that violate the equal sovereignty principle.  Looking at 
equal sovereignty in other contexts helps to illustrate why the principle is 
not inherently flawed, as striking down either statute would likely not have 
the same corrosive effects as Shelby County.  
PASPA prohibits states from operating, licensing, or authorizing any 
gambling on professional or amateur sporting events.138  The Act, however, 
provides an exception for any state that allowed sports gambling between 
1976 and 1990.139  During this period, Nevada allowed sports wagering in 
casinos, while Oregon, Montana, and Delaware authorized more limited 
sports lotteries.140  PASPA therefore violates the equal sovereignty 
principle by allowing these states to enact regulations that are off limits to 
the other states.141 
A strong argument can be made that PASPA’s “disparate geographic 
coverage” is not “sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”142  The 
Senate Judiciary Committee’s report states that the purpose of PASPA is 
“to prohibit sports gambling conducted by, or authorized under the law of, 
                                                                                                                 
 137. This section contains another departure from the Colby Article. Whereas Colby does 
not speculate as to how the equal sovereignty principle would apply in other situations, this 
section explores how the principle could be applied to two federal statutes. 
 138. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2012).  
The Act, of course, does not limit other forms of gambling. 
 139. Id. § 3704. 
 140. See Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Note, Betting Against the House (and Senate):  The 
Case for Legal, State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY. L.J. 163, 
163-64, 164 n.8 (2010).   
 141. In Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 304 (3d Cir. 
2009), the Third Circuit held that Delaware could not authorize single game betting because 
the state did not allow such practices during the statutory period.  PASPA therefore 
unequally limits the sovereignty of even the grandfathered states. 
 142. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2616 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. 
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009)).   
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any State or other governmental entity.”143 If this statement is accepted as 
PASPA’s purpose, a court could find, as Senator Charles Grassley asserted 
in the Committee Report, that “[t]here is simply no rational basis, as a 
matter of Federal policy, for allowing sports wagering in three States, while 
prohibiting it in the other 47.”144   
In NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, however, the Third Circuit held 
that PASPA does not violate the equal sovereignty principle.145  NCAA 
arose from a challenge to New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law, which 
authorized sports gambling in New Jersey casinos in an attempt to draw 
sports betting revenue from Las Vegas to Atlantic City.146  The Third 
Circuit upheld PASPA by finding that PASPA’s “true purpose” is “to stop 
the spread of state-sanctioned sports gambling” rather than to eliminate 
it.147  The court found that PASPA’s disparate geographic coverage, was 
justified because “[t]argeting only states where the practice did not exist 
is . . . precisely tailored to address the problem.”148  The court therefore 
held that equal sovereignty principle did not invalidate PASPA.149   
                                                                                                                 
 143. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3553.  
According to the Senate report, “Sports gambling . . .  undermines public confidence in the 
character of professional and amateur sports,” “promote[s] gambling among our Nation’s 
young people,” and inflicts harm “beyond the borders of those States that sanction it.”  Id. at 
4-5, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555-56. 
 144. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3563; 
see also Joshua Winneker et al., Sports Gambling and the Expanded Sovereignty Doctrine, 
13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 38, 53 (2013) (same); Galasso, supra note 140, at 167 (“It is 
difficult to understand why an exception was carved out for these states if sports wagering is 
indeed as dangerous as the majority of Congress believed.”); Michael Welsh, Note, Betting 
on State Equality: How the Expanded Equal Sovereignty Doctrine Applies to the Commerce 
Clause and Signals the Demise of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 55 
B.C. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (2014) (arguing that PASPA is unconstitutional under equal 
sovereignty).  In fact, a number of bipartisan bills have been proposed in Congress that 
would end Nevada’s exemption.  See generally Aaron Slavin, Comment, The “Las Vegas 
Loophole” and the Current Push in Congress Towards a Blanket Prohibition on Collegiate 
Sports Gambling, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 715 (2002). 
 145. 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 146. See Welsh, supra note 144, at 1012. 
 147. NCAA, 730 F.3d at 239. 
 148. Id.  The Third Circuit’s reasoning, if used in other contexts, would virtually always 
allow Congress to grandfather in existing state regulations that are inconsistent with an 
otherwise uniform federal law. 
 149. The Third Circuit also expressed skepticism that the equal sovereignty doctrine 
should apply to federal law passed under the Commerce Clause.  The court stressed that 
Shelby County was decided in the context of voting rights, which is “an area ‘the Framers of 
the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves.’”  Id. at 238 (quoting Shelby 
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In sum, the equal soveringty principle’s application to PASPA is 
indeterminate.  The constitutionality of PASPA likely hinges on how the 
courts define the problem targeted by Congress.150  If the problem is 
defined as gambling on sports, Nevada’s exemption is arguably irrational.  
However, if the problem is defined as halting the spread of sports gambling, 
the Third Circuit’s decision to uphold the law makes sense. 
Like PASPA, the Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes one state to pass 
legislation that is off limits to other states.151  Although the CAA prohibits 
states from enacting motor vehicle emissions standards, it authorizes the 
EPA to waive the prohibition for any state that regulated emissions before 
March 30, 1966.152  When Congress enacted the CAA in 1970, it knew that 
California was the only state that could qualify.153  In 1977, Congress then 
gave the other states the option to follow California’s standards rather than 
those set by the federal government.154  The CAA therefore violates the 
                                                                                                                 
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013)).  For the Third Circuit, equal sovereignty does 
not apply with the same force to regulations passed under the Commerce Clause because 
“Congress’ exercises of Commerce Clause authority are aimed at matters of national concern 
and finding national solutions will necessarily affect states differently.” Id. 
The Third Circuit, however, is wrong to suggest that equal sovereignty should be limited to 
the Fifteenth Amendment or the facts of Shelby County. See Welsh, supra note 144, at 1027-
29 (arguing that equal sovereignty should apply to statutes passed under the Commerce 
Clause); Winneker et al., supra note 144, at 52 (same); cf. Colby, supra note 78 (arguing that 
Congress must adhere to a principle of uniformity when legislating under its commerce 
power).  Equal sovereignty is based on basic federalism concerns that transcend the context 
of any one constitutional provision.  As explained below, the Court has repeatedly limited 
Congress’s commerce power based on similar structural federalism concerns.  If anything, 
equal sovereignty should apply with greater force to the Commerce Clause, since “principles 
of federalism that constrain Congress' exercise of its Commerce Clause powers are 
attenuated when Congress acts pursuant to its powers to enforce the Civil War 
Amendments.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468 (1991); see also City of Rome v. 
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (noting that the Reconstruction Amendments “were 
specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state 
sovereignty.”). 
 150. This is similar to the Court’s test for the Commerce Clause, which can often turn on 
how the courts define the activity that is being regulated.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1 (2005). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012). 
 152. Id. § 7543(b).   
 153. Brader, supra note 72, at 121. 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 7507; 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e).   
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equal sovereignty principle by granting only California the power to 
develop new auto emissions standards.155 
Congress nevertheless has a strong argument that the CAA is 
constitutional because its enhancement of California’s sovereignty is 
sufficiently related to its goal of reducing emissions.  The House report 
states, “California was afforded special status due to that State’s pioneering 
role in regulating automobile-related emissions, which pre-dated the 
Federal effort. In addition, California’s air pollution problem was then, and 
still appears to be, among the most pervasive and acute in the Nation.”156 
Due to California’s “pioneering role,” it has expertise in emissions 
regulations that other states lack.  Moreover, allowing each state to pass 
different emissions standards would be far too disruptive to the auto 
market,157 and, because of its large size, California has “an economy large 
enough to support separate standards.”158  In sum, Congress arguably had a 
good reason to unequally limit the sovereign power of the states in the 
CAA, meaning that the Act is arguably constitutional. The flexibility of the 
equal sovereignty principle, as demonstrated by its potential application to 
PASPA and the CAA, belies scholarly criticism that the principle is 
unworkable or that it poses a threat to individual rights. 
III. The History of Equal Sovereignty 
Scholars have perhaps most passionately argued that the equal 
sovereignty principle ignores constitutional history.  Eric Posner, for 
example, complains that Shelby County contains “[n]one of the usual 
impressive array of founding authorities.”159  Many others contend that the 
principle lacks “any real appreciation of how the Civil War amendments, 
including the Fifteenth Amendment, changed the state-federal balance of 
power and the scope of the Tenth Amendment.”160  Reva Siegel further 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See Brader, supra note 72; Colby, supra note 78, at 344 (asserting that the CAA “is 
an egregious example of discrimination among the states”). 
 156. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 301 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 
1380. 
 157. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 314 (2003).  Representative William L. Springer of Illinois, for 
example, argued that allowing each state to regulate its own emission standards would be 
unworkable because “[w]hen you do that it means that you cannot drive from one county to 
another in Illinois, just the same as you could not drive in 50 different States, and you would 
have all different laws . . . .” Brader, supra note 72, at 124. 
 158. See Carlson, supra note 157, at 314. 
 159. Posner, supra note 10. 
 160. Hasen, supra note 11, at 732; see also sources cited supra note 11. 
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asserts that the equal sovereignty principle “effaces the history of the Civil 
War and the Second Reconstruction.”161   
Likely because they have focused on an erroneous principle of equal 
treatment rather than equal sovereignty, Shelby County’s critics have again 
missed their mark.  The idea of equal state sovereignty has been a 
fundamental assumption of our constitutional order throughout United 
States history.162  The system developed at the Constitutional Convention, 
and followed throughout the antebellum period, assumed that the states 
were equal members of the Union.  Rather than undermining this 
assumption, the Reconstruction Amendments empowered the federal 
government to treat the states differently only when doing so was 
sufficiently related to the protection of individual rights.  Even the New 
Deal constitutional revolution, which was used to pass the civil rights 
legislation of the 1960s, did not eliminate the constitutional underpinnings 
of equal sovereignty.  When the Roberts Court transformed this structural 
assumption of equal sovereignty into an enforceable check on federal 
power, it was using familiar reasoning to add a modest new element to its 
modern federalism jurisprudence. 
A. The Antebellum Period 
The principle of equal state sovereignty can be traced back to colonial 
ideas of federalism and sovereignty.  According to legal historian Alison 
LaCroix, the core of eighteenth-century American federalism “was a belief 
that multiple independent levels of government could legitimately exist 
within a single polity, and that such an arrangement was not a defect to be 
lamented but a virtue to be celebrated.”163  This belief arose as a response to 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Siegel, supra note 8, at 71; see also Heller, supra note 11, at 371 (“The Court’s 
decision in Shelby County largely ignored the story of race and voting that led to the 
enactment of the VRA.”).  The “Second Reconstruction” refers to the Civil Rights 
Movement. 
 162. This marks two other material distinctions between Colby’s work and this Article. 
First, Colby has argued, in past works, that the Commerce Clause is the source of imposition 
for a uniformity principle similar to equal sovereignty. See Colby, supra note 78.  Because 
this Article defends a broader principle that applies beyond the context of commerce, it 
relies on different historical sources and arguments. Second, while Colby’s more recent 
work and this Article reach similar conclusions regarding the origins and early history of the 
equal sovereignty principle, this Article goes further and attempts to provide an account of 
how equal sovereignty survived the New Deal and fits with the Court’s modern federalism 
jurisprudence. 
 163. ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 6 
(2010). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss2/1
2016]      IN DEFENSE OF SHELBY COUNTY’S PRINCIPLE 239 
 
 
the British idea that sovereignty was indivisible because any attempt to 
divide it would end with one government ultimately seizing power.164  
Based on the colonial practice of relative local autonomy with London 
controlling imperial affairs such as international trade and war, eighteenth-
century Americans believed that sovereignty could be divided and allocated 
to different levels of government.165   
The question of how to divide power between the states and federal 
government was central to the Constitutional Convention.  In the Virginia 
Plan, James Madison proposed a strongly nationalistic structure:  the 
federal government would be given power over areas where uniformity was 
needed and a negative over all state legislation.166  Charles Pinckney, one of 
the negative’s supporters, asserted that “[s]tates must be kept in due 
subordination to the nation.”167  Madison agreed.  He stated that the 
negative was “absolutely necessary to a perfect system” because 
“[e]xperience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on 
the federal authority.”168 James Wilson explained that, just as individuals 
gave up their autonomy to join a state, the states must give up their 
sovereignty to join the Union.169 In its strongest form,170 the negative would 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Id. at 9.  It was often said at this time that an “imperium in imperio, or dominion 
within dominion” was impossible.  Id. at 9, 172-73.  The British therefore vested unitary 
sovereignty in Parliament. 
 165. Id. at 7. 
 166. See id. at 138.  The plan gave Congress the power “to negat[e] all laws passed by 
the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of 
Union.”  Id. at 148 (emphasis omitted). In other words, the “negative” of the Virginia Plan 
would have given Congress the power to invalidate state legislation much like the Supreme 
Court’s modern power of judicial review. 
 167. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 164 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND]. 
 168. Id.  Madison further asserted, “This prerogative of the General Govt. is the great 
pervading principle that must control the centrifugal tendency of the States; which, without 
it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the 
political system.”  Id. at 165. 
 169. Id. at 166, 172.  Wilson asserted that the states must purchase “[f]ederal liberty” 
with “the necessary concession of their political sovereignty.”  Id. at 166.  He continued, “If 
we mean to establish a national Govt. the States must submit themselves as individuals—the 
lawful Government must be supreme—either the Genl. or the State Government must be 
supreme.”  Id. at 172. 
 170. Whereas the Virginia Plan would have only allowed Congress a negative over laws 
that conflicted with the Constitution, Madison and others favored a more general negative 
over all state legislation.  See id. at 164-73. 
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have essentially made the states a lower house of the national legislature.171  
The federal negative, therefore, abandoned the colonial theory of divided 
sovereignty in favor of a British-inspired model that would have 
consolidated sovereignty in the national government.172 
The Convention, however, rejected Madison’s federal negative in favor 
of a system of divided sovereignty.  Many framers were unwilling to accept 
the negative’s encroachment on state sovereignty.173  Hugh Williamson 
“was agst. giving a power that might restrain the States from regulating 
their internal police.”174  Elbridge Gerry charged that “[t]he Natl. 
Legislature with such a power may enslave the States” and “enable the 
Genl. Govt. to depress a part for the benefit of another part.”175 Gunning 
Bedford, who tied the negative to representation in the national 
government, worried that the negative would allow the “large States [to] 
crush the small ones whenever they stand in the way of their ambitions or 
interested views.”176  Pierce Butler “was vehement agst. the Negative in the 
proposed extent, as cutting off all hope of equal justice to the distant 
States.”177  These framers rejected the federal negative because it was 
inconsistent with independent state sovereignty.178  For these framers, the 
problem of divided sovereignty “could not be solved by merging two levels 
of government into one compound legislature.”179 
After rejecting the negative’s consolidation of sovereignty in the national 
government, the framers settled on a plan that would both divide power 
between the states and federal government and empower the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 171. As LaCroix explains, “Madison’s comments suggest that he envisioned the 
legislatures operating almost as a single system—a compound legislature comprising inferior 
and superior bodies.”  LACROIX, supra note 163, at 152.  In Madison’s words, “The States 
cd. of themselves then pass no operative act, any more than one branch of a Legislature 
where there are two branches, can proceed without the other.”  FARRAND, supra note 167, at 
165. 
 172. Madison modeled the veto on the British Privy Council, which had similar authority 
over colonial laws.  See LACROIX, supra note 163, at 139-45. 
 173. See id. at 156 (“For many delegates, the prospect of a sweeping congressional power 
to veto states laws . . . threatened the integrity of the states themselves.”). 
 174. FARRAND, supra note 167, at 165. 
 175. Id. at 165, 171. 
 176. Id. at 167. 
 177. Id. at 168. 
 178. See LACROIX, supra note 163, at 157. 
 179. See id. at 158. 
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judiciary to police this division.180  Sovereignty was divided by granting 
only limited enumerated powers to Congress and leaving the rest to the 
state governments.181  The Supreme Court was then empowered to police 
this division through the Supremacy Clause, which declares that federal law 
is the supreme law of each state, and Article III, which is “‘tailored to 
facilitate Supreme Court enforcement’ of the Supremacy Clause.”182  
Through these clauses, the Court has the power to declare both that 
Congress has exceeded its enumerated powers (and therefore infringed on 
the subjects left for the states) and that states have acted beyond their 
proper sphere of power in violation of federal law. 
Federalists used the Constitution’s theory of divided sovereignty as a 
strong argument for ratification.183  Following the British tradition, anti-
federalists argued that sovereignty could not be split between the states and 
federal government.184  In Federalist No. 9, Alexander Hamilton, one of the 
most extreme nationalists at the Constitutional Convention, replied that the 
“Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of State governments, 
makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty . . . and leaves in 
their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign 
power.”185  In Federalist No. 32, he further explained that “the State 
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they 
before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the 
United States.”186  Hamilton expanded on his views in a speech at the New 
York ratifying convention.  He declared that “[t]he laws of the United 
States are supreme, as to all their proper, constitutional objects:  The laws 
of the states are supreme in the same way.”187  James Madison made the 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Id. at 169 (stating that the negative had “a theoretical commitment to unitary 
sovereignty”).  Madison, however, never wavered from his belief that the negative was 
needed.  Id. at 162-63. 
 181. Id. at 171. 
 182. Id. at 164 (internal citations omitted). 
 183. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM:  THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN, 51-53 (1987). 
 184. In Antifederalist No. 17, for example, Brutus contended the federal government 
would use the combination of implied powers and the Supremacy Clause to abrogate state 
sovereignty and wield virtually limitless power.  THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 17. 
 185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 46 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).  
 186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 187. ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS 510 (Joanne B. Freeman ed., 2001).  Hamilton 
further stated that the states “are absolutely necessary to the system.” Id. at 508.  He 
continued, “Their existence must form a leading principle in the most perfect constitution we 
could form.  I insist, that it never can be the interest or desire of the national legislature, to 
destroy the state governments.”  Id.  Other federalists made similar statements.  See, e.g., 
BERGER, supra note 183, at 57-59. 
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same points in Federalist No. 39 when he said that the Constitution was 
“partly federal and partly national” because it “leaves to the several States a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects” not delegated to 
the federal government.188 Although the line between state and federal 
power would not always be clear,189 consolidation of sovereignty in any one 
level would be avoided by making the United States Supreme Court police 
of the division of authority.190   
The Federalists’ theory of divided sovereignty presupposes states that are 
equal in power.  According to the Federalists, the states and federal 
government derived their sovereignty from different sources.  The people of 
each state granted power to the state governments, and when doing so, they 
had an equal right to determine the amount of sovereignty granted.  The 
people of the Union then ratified the Constitution and conferred sovereign 
power on the federal government and placed limitations on the sovereignty 
of the states.  As the Federalist Papers remind us, the states, as “coequal 
societies,”191 “retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had.”192  
This idea is confirmed in the Tenth Amendment, which provides, “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”193  Because the states derive their power independently from 
the people of each state, they each have an equal claim to sovereignty.  For 
                                                                                                                 
 188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 197, 198 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).  In 
Federalist 39, Madison referred to the states as “coequal societies.”  Id. at 196; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 81, at 314 (“[T]he equal vote allowed to each State [in the 
Senate] is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of the sovereignty remaining in 
the individual States . . . .”). John Dickinson similarly stated that the Constitution composed 
a government “by a combination of republics, each retaining all the rights of supreme 
sovereignty, excepting such as ought to be contributed to the union.”  3 FARRAND, supra 
note 167, at 304. Supporters of ratification also commonly asserted that the Constitution left 
local matters the states.  See BERGER, supra note 183, at 68-69.  In Connecticut, for example, 
Sherman told voters that “[t]he Powers vested in the federal government are clearly defined, 
so that each state will retain its sovereignty in what concerns its own internal 
government . . . .”  Id. at 70. 
 189. See BERGER, supra note 183, at 62 (quoting Wilson as telling the Pennsylvania 
Convention that he could not pretend “that the line [between state and federal power] is 
drawn with mathematical precision,” but that “the powers are as minutely enumerated and 
defined as was possible.”). 
 190. See LACROIX, supra note 163, at 135 (stating that the Convention intended to have 
the judiciary “mediate between state and general governments”). 
 191. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 188, at 196 (Madison). 
 192. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 186, at 155 (Hamilton). 
 193. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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the Federalists, the structure of the Union implied that, at least as a default, 
the states were equal in sovereign power.  
This conception of the Union, however, was not universally accepted.  A 
competing theory of federalism, advanced by Southern leaders such as 
Spencer Roane and John C. Calhoun, rejected the founders’ idea that 
sovereignty could be divided between two levels of government.  Unitary 
sovereignty instead resided with the states, and the Union was a mere 
compact between these true sovereign powers.194  Moreover, because the 
states were the sovereign creators of the Constitution, the states themselves 
could judge the extent of the powers delegated to the federal government.195  
Secessionists took this argument a step further by arguing that the northern 
states’ violation of constitutional provisions like the Fugitive Slave Clause 
relieved the Southern states of any obligation to remain bound by the 
compact.196  Under compact theory, the federal government lacked the 
power to limit state sovereignty at all, much less unequally.197   
Nationalists responded to compact theory with the framers’ theory of 
divided sovereignty.  In McCulloch v. Maryland198 and Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee,199 the Marshall Court used divided sovereignty to reject compact 
theorists’ contention that the Supreme Court lacked the power to render an 
interpretation of the Constitution that was binding on the states.200  In 
McCulloch, Marshall began by explaining that “[t]he government proceeds 
directly from the people.”201  The people, he explained, delegated sovereign 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 84, at 127. 
 195. 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 68-73 (Richard K. Crall ed., 1857); JOHN 
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 148 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) 
[hereinafter JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE]. 
 196. See, e.g., SECESSION DEBATED 7-8, 41-42 (William W. Freehling & Craig M. 
Simpson eds., 1992) (speeches by Thomas R. R. Cobb and Senator Robert Toombs). 
 197. Although compact theory is best known for its association with nullification and 
secession, it was advanced throughout the antebellum period on both sides of the Mason-
Dixon Line.  See, e.g., CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS:  THE PEOPLE AND 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 210-11, 218 (2008) 
(discussing the use of various approaches to compact theory by James Madison, Calhoun, 
and the Hartford Convention); 3 FARRAND, supra note 167, at 183, 192 (statements of Luther 
Martin); Jeffrey Schmitt, Rethinking Ableman v. Booth and States’ Rights in Wisconsin, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1315, 1329 (2007) (discussing compact theory and its use in antislavery 
constitutional argument in the North). 
 198. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819). 
 199. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 200. See ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 180-85 (1991). 
 201. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403. 
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power to the federal government in the Constitution and to the state 
governments in each state constitution.202  As Marshall stated, “[T]he 
powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, 
and those of the States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects 
committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed 
to the other.”203  Justice Joseph Story, perhaps the strongest nationalist on 
the antebellum court,204 expressed similar views. In his highly influential 
Commentaries on the Constitution, he asserted that “it is perfectly clear that 
the sovereign powers vested in State governments . . . remained unaltered 
and unimpaired except so far as they were granted to the government of the 
United States.”205  Moreover, in his opinion for the Court in Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, Story adopted the Federalists’ idea that the people had 
created the Supreme Court as the neutral arbiter of disputes regarding the 
allocation of sovereignty between the states and federal government.206 
Daniel Webster, “the Expounder of the Constitution” and northern leader 
of the Whig Party in Congress,207 expressed similar views in his famous 
debate with Hayne over the nullification crisis in 1830.  Webster 
proclaimed that the federal government 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Id. at 410. 
 203. Id.  Marshall expanded on his arguments in a public defense of McCulloch in the 
Philadelphia Union and the Alexandria Gazette.  See JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, supra 
note 195, at 195 (“The United States is a nation; but a nation composed of states in many, 
though not in all, respects, sovereign.”). 
 204. See JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 238 
(1971) (“His major concern, during some thirty-four years of vigorous judicial activity, was 
to strengthen and expand the powers of the federal government; and some would add he did 
his best to emasculate the powers of the states.”). 
 205. See STORY, supra note 78, § 417. 
 206. Although Chief Justice Marshall was recused in Martin, his public defense of 
McCulloch made essentially the same points as Justice Story.  JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, 
supra note 195, at 203-14.  Marshall also defended the Supreme Court’s role in Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414-15 (1821).  The Taney Court defended divided 
sovereignty in a number of opinions as well.  See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 
516 (1858) (“[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist 
and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct 
sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective 
spheres.”); The License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 588-89 (1847) (“The federal government is 
supreme within the scope of its delegated powers, and the State governments are equally 
supreme in the exercise of those powers not delegated by them . . . .”); New York v. Miln, 
36 U.S. 102, 138 (1837) (“[A] state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over 
all persons and things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where that 
jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the [C]onstitution . . . .”). 
 207. ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 28-29 (1997). 
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is as popular, just as truly emanating from the people as the State 
Governments.  It is created for one purpose; the State 
Governments for another.  It has its own powers; they have 
theirs.  There is no more authority with them to arrest the 
operation of a law of Congress, than with Congress to arrest the 
operation of their laws.208 
Webster further asserted that any fear that the North would use federal 
power to interfere with the slave law of the Southern states was “wholly 
unfounded and unjust” because it would “evade the constitutional compact 
and to extend the power of the Government over the internal laws and 
domestic condition of the States.”209  Therefore, even Webster, the great 
defender of the Union, shared the federalists’ belief in divided sovereignty, 
which gave each state an equal and complete right to govern all local 
matters not delegated to the federal government.210  
During the secession crisis, President Lincoln also invoked divided 
sovereignty.  In his first inaugural address, Lincoln told the South, “I have 
no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery 
in the States where it exists.  I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I 
have no inclination to do so.”211  In the same speech, Lincoln reminded the 
                                                                                                                 
 208. SPEECHES OF HAYNE AND WEBSTER IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ON THE 
RESOLUTION OF MR. FOOT, JANUARY, 1830, at 78 (Redding & Co., 1852).  Webster further 
asserted, 
The States are unquestionably sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not 
affected by this supreme law [of the Constitution.] . . . We are all agents of the 
same supreme power, the people.  The General Government and the State 
Governments derive their authority from the same source.  Neither can, in 
relation to the other, be called primary; though one is definite and restricted, 
and the other general and residuary. 
Id. at 70. 
 209. Id. at 44. 
 210. See Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite 
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 44 (“Webster too admitted the necessity for keeping ‘the 
general government and the State government each in its proper sphere.’”) (quoting THE 
GREAT SPEECHES AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 272 (Little, Brown & Co., 1889) 
(“Whipple’s edition”)). In his response to nullification, President Andrew Jackson similarly 
asserted that the states and federal government must each exercise their powers “within its 
appropriate sphere” and warned that the “destruction of our State governments or the 
annihilation of their control over the local concerns of the people would lead directly to 
revolution and anarchy.” STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 108 (Frederick D. Drake & Lynn R. Nelson eds., 1999). 
 211. ABRAHAM LINCOLN:  HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 580 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946) 
(emphasis added).  Lincoln further said that the proposed Corwin Amendment, which would 
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South that his Republican Party had adopted the following in its platform in 
1860:  “That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and 
especially the right of each state to order and control its own domestic 
institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that 
balance of powers on which the perfection and endurance of our political 
fabric depends . . . .”212 
The Union Army, of course, ultimately vindicated the constitutional 
structure of Lincoln, Webster, and Marshall and defeated compact theory 
and its elevation of the states over the federal government.  The victory of 
the Union, however, did not bring about the end of the states or create 
national sovereignty over all matters.  Instead, it secured the victory of 
divided sovereignty—a theory that implied the equal power of the states. 
B. Reconstruction 
After the Confederacy’s surrender, however, Congress did not permit the 
Southern states to reenter the Union on equal terms.  Republicans feared 
that a return to the old constitutional order would allow the Southern states 
to ignore or reverse the transformative effects of the war.  Without personal 
liberty, protection from racial violence, and economic rights, Republicans 
feared that “emancipation would be little more than a mockery.”213  The 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were therefore passed to give the 
federal government the power to protect these fundamental individual 
rights.  The Fifteenth Amendment also guaranteed black suffrage, so that 
the freedmen could use the franchise to guarantee state protection and thus 
make prolonged federal intervention unnecessary.  Together, the 
Reconstruction Amendments limited state power and significantly 
enhanced the authority of the federal government. 
Historians vigorously debate the extent to which the Amendments 
departed from the basic structure of antebellum federalism.  A number of 
scholars contend that the Reconstruction Amendments brought about 
revolutionary changes in federalism by granting Congress broad powers to 
legislate directly to protect individual rights.214  Robert J. Kazorowski, for 
                                                                                                                 
have prohibited Congress from abolishing or interfering with slavery, was already “implied 
constitutional law.”  Id. at 587. 
 212. KIRK H. PORTER & DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-
1956, at 32 (1974). 
 213. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 
225 (1989). 
 214. This view is most comprehensively presented in the work of Robert J. Kazorowski.  
See ROBERT J. KAZOROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
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example, concludes that “with the Thirteenth and then the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Constitution of the United States gave to all Americans the 
fundamental rights of citizenship and delegated to Congress the authority to 
protect citizens in their enjoyment of these rights.”215  Under this 
interpretation, the state action doctrine, which prevents Congress from 
protecting individual rights from being violated by private parties, 
emasculates the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.216  Rather 
than relying on its commerce power, Congress therefore should have been 
able to enact legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 directly under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.217 
Other historians contend that the Reconstruction Amendments were 
designed to operate within the antebellum structure of federalism.  
According to these scholars, the conservative Republicans who dominated 
the Reconstruction Congress merely intended for the Amendments to 
prohibit the states from violating individual rights.218  Michael Les 
Benedict, for example, claims that Republicans possessed an “overriding 
desire to preserve for the states the primary responsibility for the protection 
of citizens’ rights.”219  Moreover, prominent conservative Republicans 
                                                                                                                 
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN A RACIST SOCIETY, 1866-1883 (1987) [hereinafter KAZOROWSKI, 
THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS]; ROBERT J. KAZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-
1876 (1985) [hereinafter KAZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION]; Robert 
J. Kazorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the 
Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45 (1987) [hereinafter Kazorowski, To Begin the Nation 
Anew]; see also, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801 
(2010). 
 215. Kazorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 214, at 49. 
 216. KAZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 214, at 214-
17; KAZOROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 214, at 303-07, 337.   
 217. See Balkin, supra note 214, at 1801. 
 218. Benedict provides the most detailed and convincing historical argument in favor of 
this interpretation. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: 
CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869 (1974) [hereinafter 
BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE]; Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: 
Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39 [hereinafter Benedict, 
Preserving Federalism]; Michael Les Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The 
Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM. HIST. 65 (1974) [hereinafter 
Benedict, Preserving the Constitution]; see also, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS 1863-1869 (1990); FONER, supra note 213, at 259 (asserting 
that “few Republicans wished to break completely with the principles of federalism” and 
“[m]ost Republicans assumed the states would retain the largest authority over local 
affairs.”). 
 219. Benedict, Preserving the Constitution, supra note 218, at 76.   
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repeatedly claimed that the Amendments did not fundamentally alter the 
federal system.220  Under this view, Congress could act under its 
enforcement powers only when the states failed to obey the commands of 
the Amendments.221 In this way, the Amendments “preserved the state 
jurisdiction upon which Republicans had been so unwilling to encroach.”222   
Regardless of which interpretation is correct, however, the 
Reconstruction Amendments did not jettison the basic structure of divided 
sovereignty adopted at the Convention and accepted throughout the 
antebellum era.  Even under an expansive reading of the Amendments, they 
do not grant Congress the unitary sovereignty of the English Parliament or 
                                                                                                                 
 220. Id. at 77; see also Benedict, Preserving Federalism, supra note 218, at 48.  For 
example, John Bingham, the drafter of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, explained 
that “[i]t takes from no State any right . . . but it imposes a limitation upon the States to 
correct their abuses of power.”  FONER, supra note 213, at 259.  Bingham further declared 
that “the care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen . . . is in the States and 
not the federal government.  I have sought to effect no change in that respect.”  CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess.  1292 (1866); see also, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1090 (1866); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1785 (Sen. Stewart), 476, 600 (Sen. 
Trumbull) (1866). Even prior to Reconstruction, Bingham believed that Article IV’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibited the states from violating the civil rights of state 
citizens, regardless of race.  GERALD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN 
BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 63-64 (2013).  Bingham 
designed the Amendment so that the federal government could ensure that the states upheld 
this obligation rather than relying on the good faith of the states.  See id. at 113-15.  In this 
way, the Amendment did not undermine states’ rights because no state had any right “to 
withhold from any citizen of the United States within its limits . . . any of the privileges of a 
citizen of the United States.”  Id. at 116 (quoting Bingham). 
 221. Although most scholars, like Benedict, focus on the Fourteenth Amendment, this 
analysis applies with equal force to the Fifteenth Amendment.  To the chagrin of some 
Radical Republicans, the Fifteenth Amendment did not federalize voting or require the states 
to have uniform standards.  Instead, while the Amendment prohibits racial discrimination in 
voting rights, states retain the sovereign power to run elections and enact voting legislation.  
As one Senator explained, “The whole question of suffrage, subject to the restriction that 
there shall be no discrimination on account of race, is left as it now is.”  FONER, supra note 
213, at 446.  Republicans sought to enfranchise blacks, who voted Republican, while 
preserving the states’ right to disenfranchise the poor, illiterate, and immigrant populations, 
all of whom generally voted Democrat.  Id. at 446-47.  In fact, the Fifteenth Amendment 
renewed calls from both parties to end federal intervention within the Southern states.  James 
Garfield, for example, asserted that “[t]he Fifteenth Amendment confers upon the African 
race the care of its own destiny.  It places their fortunes in their own hands.”  Id. at 449; see 
also Benedict, Preserving Federalism, supra note 218, at 48-49.  Like the other 
Reconstruction Amendments, the Fifteenth Amendment was not meant to radically alter the 
structure of federalism. 
 222. Benedict, Preserving the Constitution, supra note 218, at 90. 
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unlimited power to infringe on the sovereignty of the states.  At most, they 
grant the limited power to legislate for the protection of individual rights.  
In other words, while Congress may be able to limit state sovereignty under 
its Reconstruction powers, it can only do so when its actions are sufficiently 
related to the protection of individual rights.  Shelby County’s critics are 
therefore incorrect to assert that the equal sovereignty principle—which 
requires only that federal laws that unequally limit state sovereign powers 
be sufficiently related to the problem Congress seeks to address—is 
inconsistent with the history of Reconstruction.  
Legislation passed during Reconstruction confirms this understanding.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (the Act) guarantees to all persons, regardless 
of race, the equal protection of the laws and an equal right to contract, bring 
lawsuits, and own land.223  Although the Act gave the federal government 
the ultimate responsibility to protect individual civil rights, its structure 
nevertheless demonstrates the continuing vitality of state sovereignty.  
Under the Act, the states retain primary responsibility to protect individual 
rights by providing law enforcement, equal access to the courts, and other 
services.  The federal government can intervene only if a state effectively 
allows the reinstitution of a condition analogous to slavery by failing to 
adequately protect the civil rights of its citizens.224  The Civil Rights Act, 
therefore, gives the federal government the power to limit state sovereignty 
only when doing so is “sufficiently related to” the protection of individual 
rights.225 
The Reconstruction Act of 1867 created military rule within the South 
and placed conditions on the readmission of the Southern states.226 
However, Republicans assumed that once the Southern states provided civil 
and political equality, the freedmen would gain sufficient power within the 
states to prevent future deprivations.227  Large-scale federal interference 
with local state sovereignty was thus meant to end as soon as the Southern 
states provided the freedmen with equal civil rights.228 As Eric Foner 
                                                                                                                 
 223. Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-26, 14 Stat. 27. 
 224. See FONER, supra note 213, at 245. 
 225. And yet, President Johnson vetoed the act on the grounds that it was a “stride 
towards centralization, and the concentration of all legislative powers in the national 
Government.”  Id. at 250 (quoting Johnson).  The Act was passed over his veto.  Id. 
 226. These conditions included the ratification of new constitutions including manhood 
suffrage and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 276. 
 227. Id. at 277. 
 228. However, some moderate Republicans thought the Act was unconstitutional because 
it infringed too far on state sovereignty.  When Congress added new conditions in 1870, 
Lyman Trumball, for example, “insisted that Congress could no more dictate the contents of 
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explains, Republicans “expected the relatively rapid return of the Southern 
states as equal members of the Union.”229  The Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, 
which provided direct legal and economic assistance to the freedmen, was 
similarly viewed as a temporary measure justified only by the South’s 
attempted secession.230  These measures are consistent with equal 
sovereignty because, although the Reconstruction Act and Freedmen’s 
Bureau unequally limited the sovereign power of the Southern states, they 
were sufficiently related to the problem of protecting the individual rights 
of the freedmen. 
Even the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,231 perhaps the most radical of the 
Reconstruction statutes, reflects Congress’s continued assumption of equal 
state sovereignty.  Congress passed the law to give President Grant the 
authority to address rampant Klan violence that was undermining the 
economic and political rights of the freedmen in the South.232 The Act made 
it a federal crime for individuals to conspire to deny the rights of others to 
vote, hold office, serve on juries, or enjoy the equal protection of the laws.  
Although the law applied to individuals as well as state actors, Republicans 
defended the constitutionality of the law by arguing that the state’s failure 
to protect the rights guaranteed by the Amendments amounted to state 
action that justified a federal response.233  The Act therefore reflects the 
Republican belief that the Fourteenth Amendment limited state sovereignty 
by prohibiting states from violating individual rights and granted Congress 
the limited power to step in only when the states failed to abide by the 
Constitution. By this logic, the Act’s unequal intervention in the Southern 
states was consistent with the equal sovereignty principle because it was 
sufficiently related to Congress’s need to address the southern states’ 
inaction in the face of massive violence.  As Benedict explains, “No one 
who reads the debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act can fail to be impressed 
with the effort Republicans made to reconcile their desire to afford 
                                                                                                                 
Southern state constitutions than interfere in the affairs of the North.”  Id. at 453.  More 
generally, moderate Republican leader Carl Schurz warned that using federal power to 
protect the freedmen could create a “habit of overriding State rights.”  Id. at 498. 
 229. Id. at 277.  
 230. Id. at 150-53, 243; Benedict, Preserving Federalism, supra note 218, at 48. 
 231. The Enforcement Act of 1871, Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 232. See FONER, supra note 213, at 455-58.   
 233. Benedict, Preserving Federalism, supra note 218, at 50; Robert J. Kaczorowski, 
Searching for the Intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368, 
398 (1972).  Bingham, for example, asserted that Congress could act “against the denial of 
rights by States, whether the denial be acts of omission or commission.”  MAGLIOCCA, supra 
note 220, at 161; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong. 1st Sess. app. at 85 (1871). 
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protection to citizens in the South with the contours of the federal system 
they wanted to preserve.”234 
Republican policy during Reconstruction in other areas further 
demonstrates that they did not believe the Amendments gave Congress 
unlimited power to infringe on state sovereignty.235  For example, when 
Southern states that had been redeemed by Democrats dismantled public 
schools created during Reconstruction, some Republicans proposed that the 
federal government directly provide education.236  Because “[m]any 
Republicans also viewed education as a state responsibility,” however, the 
proposal “generated little support and never came to a vote.”237  Proposals 
to provide federal services in healthcare, railroads, and the telegraph met a 
similar fate.238  Moreover, although Congress established an eight-hour 
workday for federal employees, the regulation of private industry was left 
to the states.239  When discussing a federal bill to impose a quarantine to 
end the cholera epidemic in 1866, Republican Senator James W. Grimes 
stated: 
During the prevalence of the war we drew to ourselves here as 
the Federal Government authority which had been considered 
doubtful by all and denied by many of the statesmen of this 
country. That time . . . has ceased and ought to cease. Let us go 
back to the original condition of things, and allow the States to 
take care of themselves.240 
Although most Republicans felt free to interfere with local affairs in the 
South to protect the rights of the freedmen, they were not willing to destroy 
state sovereignty, especially in the North.  According to Republican John 
Bingham, the author of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“Equality of men and States before the law, was the watchword, the central, 
informing, vital thought of the Republican party.”241 
                                                                                                                 
 234. Benedict, Preserving Federalism, supra note 218, at 50. 
 235. Foner explains that “even among Republicans, doubts about the activist state 
persisted, and of numerous initiatives envisioning a continued expansion of federal 
authority, only a handful were enacted into law.”  FONER, supra note 213, at 451. 
 236. Id. at 452. 
 237. Id.  Republicans could not even pass a bill that would have helped finance state-run 
public schools.  Id. 
 238. Id. at 451-52. 
 239. Id. at 480-81. 
 240. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2446 (1866); Benedict, Preserving Federalism, 
supra note 218, at 47. 
 241. MAGLIOCCA, supra note 220, at 154. 
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Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
Supreme Court also interpreted the Amendments to preserve state 
sovereignty.242  The Slaughter House Cases,243 for example, narrowly 
interpreted federal power under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and 
United States v. Cruikshank244 held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
grant the federal government the power to protect individuals from private 
violence.  The Court not only interpreted federal power under the 
Reconstruction Amendments narrowly but it also repeatedly struck down 
federal legislation on the grounds that Congress could not regulate areas 
reserved for the states.245  The Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart,246 for 
example, stated, “The power of the States to regulate their purely internal 
affairs by such laws as seem wise to the local authority is inherent and has 
never been surrendered to the general government.”247  As the Court 
explained in Pennoyer v. Neff, “[E]xcept as restrained and limited by [the 
Constitution,] [the states] possess and exercise the authority of independent 
States.”248  During this era, the Court believed that, because of this 
independent and inherent authority, “[t]he several States are of equal 
dignity and authority.”249 
  
                                                                                                                 
 242. The Supreme Court’s Reconstruction jurisprudence is well known for its 
preservation of federalism and states’ rights.  Many scholars contend that the Court 
subverted the intent of the Amendments in the name of federalism. See, e.g., FRANK J. 
SCATURRO, THE SUPREME COURT’S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: A DISTORTION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE (2000).  Michael Les Benedict, however, responds that 
“the Supreme Court's construction of congressional power under the constitutional 
amendments hardly subverted Republican intent. Committed, as were nearly all Americans 
of the time, to maintaining the State's primary jurisdiction over criminal offenses, endorsing 
the basic concepts of dual federalism, the Court still managed to sustain Congress's power to 
protect directly citizens' fundamental civil and political rights.”  Benedict, Preserving 
Federalism, supra note 218, at 77.  The Court’s fidelity to the framers’ intent is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 243. 83 U.S. 36, 78-79 (1872). 
 244. 92 U.S. 542, 569 (1875). 
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C. The New Deal  
After 1936, the Supreme Court changed course and upheld the New 
Deal’s vast expansion of federal power.250  While upholding the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in United States v. Darby, for example, the Court stated that 
“[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, 
may be exercised to its utmost extent,’ and ‘can neither be enlarged nor 
diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power.’”251  The Court 
continued to explain that the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism” and 
therefore imposes no limitations on federal power.252  The Court’s New 
Deal jurisprudence evolved into the modern rule that economic regulations 
are subject to rational basis review.  In cases such as Katzenbach v. 
McClung253 and Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States,254 the Court 
upheld modern civil rights law under this expansive interpretation of 
congressional power to regulate the economy.  As Bruce Ackerman has 
persuasively argued, the Court’s New Deal jurisprudence can be seen as a 
legitimate change to the Constitution that should be respected by the 
modern Supreme Court.255 
Like the constitutional changes of Reconstruction, however, the New 
Deal Constitution does not erase the background assumption of divided 
sovereignty.  The basic thrust of the New Deal adjustment is that 
congressional power to regulate the economy should not be limited by any 
perceived need to protect a separate zone of authority for the states.256  Even 
under an expansive reading of the New Deal, it did not change the “truism” 
that all power that is not delegated to the federal government is retained by 
the states and the people.  The People may have expanded Congress’s 
enumerated powers in the New Deal, but they have still divided sovereignty 
between the federal and state governments. In other words, the New Deal 
did not eliminate state sovereignty or change the framework established in 
                                                                                                                 
 250. The reasons for the Court’s “switch in time” are beyond the scope of this Article.  
For more on this issue, see, for example, BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL 
COURT:  THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998). 
 251. 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941). 
 252. Id. at 124. 
 253. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 254. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 255. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
 256. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1498 
(1994); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, (2009).  This rejected system, where a sphere of 
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1787.257 The equal sovereign power of each state is thus implicit in the 
structure of the New Deal Constitution just as it was implicit in the original 
Constitution.   
At the doctrinal level, however, the equal sovereignty principle is at odds 
with the New Deal Constitution’s use of rational basis review.  Although 
the states start with an equal level of sovereignty as a default, New Deal 
constitutional principles would apply rational basis review to any federal 
law that changes this default and unequally affects the sovereignty of the 
states.  Within the New Deal framework, state sovereignty is typically not a 
limit on federal power. Shelby County, however, limits federal power in the 
name of state sovereignty by requiring any violation of the principle of 
equal sovereignty to be “sufficiently related” to Congress’s legislative goal.  
Here, Shelby County’s critics have a point—the Court’s use of state 
sovereignty as a limit on federal power is in tension with the New Deal. 
D. New Federalism 
Shelby County’s conversion of equal sovereignty from a background 
assumption of federalism into a modest limit on federal power, however, is 
perfectly consistent with the federalism jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and 
Roberts courts.  Using “a form of structural inference,” the Court in these 
cases has developed “implied limitations in federal power that are traceable 
to some form of historically reconstructed original understanding of the 
appropriate federal-state balance.”258  These courts have been driven by a 
desire to impose some limitations on the potentially unbounded power 
granted to Congress in the New Deal.259 
In Gregory v. Ashcroft, for example, the Court held that Congress must 
give a clear statement before it will interpret a federal statute to intrude on a 
subject traditionally left for the states.260  In justifying this rule, the Court 
asserted that “under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty 
concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations 
                                                                                                                 
 257. Instead, it merely expanded the scope of federal power and reduced the scope of 
state power. 
 258. Manning, supra note 256, at 2006, 2024-25; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and 
“Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 831 (1998); Ernest A. Young, Alden v. 
Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1620 (2000). 
 259. See Manning, supra note 256, at 2020-25; H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic 
Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 894 (1999); Ernest 
Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating 
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imposed by the Supremacy Clause. . . . The States thus retain substantial 
sovereign authority under our constitutional system.”261  The clear 
statement rule is commonly invoked to narrow the reach of federal statutory 
provisions.262 
The Court also invoked structural federalism concerns to justify placing 
limitations on Congress’s enumerated powers.  In United States v. Lopez263 
and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,264 the Court 
significantly narrowed congressional power by holding that the Commerce 
Clause does not empower Congress to regulate noneconomic activity or 
create commerce. Moreover, in New York v. United States and Printz v. 
United States, the Court held that Congress cannot commandeer the states 
and force them to pass legislation or enforce federal law.265  Each of these 
cases is based on a general desire to preserve state sovereignty rather than 
any specific provision in the text.  The Court justified its decision in Printz, 
for example, by explaining that “[a]lthough the States surrendered many of 
their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty.”266 
In Alden v. Maine the Court also used structural federalism concerns to 
broadly interpret sovereign immunity to extend to suits brought in state 
court.267  The Alden court asserted that “[a]lthough the Constitution grants 
broad powers to Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the 
States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and 
joint participants in the governance of the Nation.”268  The Court then 
concluded that Congress cannot authorize suits against states in their own 
courts because doing so would “denigrate[] the separate sovereignty of the 
                                                                                                                 
 261. Id. at 457 (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)). 
 262. Manning, supra note 256, at 2025-29. 
 263. 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (concluding that the Court must ensure that a 
regulation enacted under the Commerce Clause does not blur “the boundaries between the 
spheres of federal and state authority”) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 264. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 265. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 161-69 (1992).   
 266. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-19 (internal quotations omitted).  Moreover, in Sebelius, the 
Court began its analysis with the reminder that “the National Government possesses only 
limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.”  132 S. Ct. at 2577.  The 
Court further explained that “[t]he independent power of the States also serves as a check on 
the power of the Federal Government,” and that “the Constitution is not the source of [the 
states’] power.”  Id. at 2578. 
 267. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).  The Eleventh Amendment applies only to the 
federal judicial power.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 268. Alden, 527 U.S. at 748. 
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States.”269  As a result, litigants often have no effective redress against 
wrongs committed by the state. 
Viewed within this context, the equal sovereignty principle is a modest 
and defensible contribution to the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. 
Although the New Deal constitutional approach would not limit federal 
power to protect state sovereignty, modern federalism jurisprudence uses 
constitutional law to judicially enforce basic structural features of the 
Constitution.  Based on the history discussed in this Article, the equal 
sovereignty principle arguably flows from the structure of the Constitution 
at least as naturally as the principles announced in the cases discussed 
above.  Moreover, equal sovereignty is a modest addition to the federalism 
canon, because, unlike these other doctrines that impose serious obstacles to 
federal legislation and the vindication of federal rights, equal sovereignty 
would apply only to those rare statutes that unequally limit state power.  
Moreover, unlike cases like Printz or Lopez, the equal sovereignty doctrine 
does not categorically bar Congress from regulating any particular subject 
or from passing any form of statute; instead, it merely requires that 
Congress have a good reason when it unequally limits state sovereignty.  In 
sum, equal sovereignty is consistent with constitutional history and fits 
naturally with the Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence. 
E. History and Equal Treatment 
Scholars have likely labeled the equal sovereignty principle as 
inconsistent with history only because they have equated it with equal 
treatment.  Unlike equal sovereignty, the equal treatment principle has been 
decisively rejected throughout U.S. history.  Although most scholars have 
focused their attention on Reconstruction—a time of massive federal 
intervention in the economic, political, and legal systems of only the 
Southern states—the principle of equal treatment was actually rejected 
much earlier. 
At the direction of John C. Calhoun, South Carolina advanced the equal 
treatment principle during the nullification crisis of the 1830s.  With the 
price of cotton plummeting on world markets, high federal tariffs placed a 
huge strain on South Carolina’s planter-based economy.270  In South 
Carolina’s Exposition and Protest, Calhoun argued that the tariff was 
                                                                                                                 
 269. Id. at 749. 
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unconstitutional because it did not treat the states equally.271  Calhoun 
asserted that the powers of the “general government are intended to act 
uniformly on all the parts.”272  The tariff, however, created “inequality and 
oppression” because it imposed severe economic burdens on the South that 
were then used to subsidize manufacturing in the North.273  The tariff was 
unconstitutional, Calhoun asserted, because it was “being converted into an 
instrument for rearing up the industry of one section of the country on the 
ruins of another.”274  Calhoun then developed an elaborate theory to justify 
state nullification of the allegedly unconstitutional tariff.275 
Calhoun’s constitutional theories of nullification and equal treatment, 
however, were decisively rejected by the American people.276  In his 
Proclamation on Nullification, President Jackson, for example, explained, 
“This objection [of unequal treatment] may be made with truth to every law 
that has been or can be passed.  The wisdom of man never yet contrived a 
system of taxation that would operate with perfect equality.”277   
Rejection of equal treatment, however, did not imply a rejection of equal 
sovereignty.  Jackson was also a firm believer in state sovereignty.  In his 
Second Inaugural Address, for example, Jackson asserted that “the 
destruction of our State governments or the annihilation of their control 
over the local concerns of the people would lead directly to revolution and 
anarchy.”278 
When scholars contend that the equal sovereignty principle is 
inconsistent with constitutional history, they seem to have Calhoun’s views 
on the tariff in mind.  Calhoun’s argument for equal treatment, however, is 
                                                                                                                 
 271. Although the state legislature adopted the Exposition, it was secretly written by 
Calhoun.  Freehling, supra note 270, at 257. 
 272. Exposition and Protest: Reported by the Special Committee of the House of 
Representatives of South Carolina on the Tariff (Dec. 19, 1828), reprinted in THE STATUTES 
AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 263 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1836). 
 273. Id. at 248-49.  Calhoun asserted that the tariff “imposes on the agricultural interests 
of the South . . . the burden not only of sustaining the system itself, but that also of 
sustaining government.” Id. at 249.  At the same time, he believed that “the manufacturing 
States . . . bear no share of the burden of the Tariff.” Id. 
 274. Id. at 248.  Calhoun further asserted, “This unequal lot is ours.  We are the serfs of 
the system, out of whose labor is raised, not only the money that is paid into the Treasury, 
but the funds out of which are drawn the rich reward of the manufacturer and his associate in 
interest.” Id. at 252.  See also McDonald, supra note 270, at 104. 
 275. McDonald, supra note 270, at 104-05. 
 276. Freehling, supra note 270, at 284; Kelly, supra note 200, at 211. 
 277. Proclamation No. 26, 11 Stat. 771 (Dec. 10, 1832). 
 278. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 108 
(Frederick D. Drake & Lynn R. Nelson eds., 1999). 
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very different from the principle of equal sovereignty.  Like President 
Jackson, even supporters of a strong national government believed that 
sovereignty was divided between the state and federal governments with the 
people of each state having the right to create state governments equal in 
power. 
F. A Racist Legacy 
Several scholars go so far as to contend that the equal sovereignty 
principle should be rejected because of its association with slavery and Jim 
Crow.  James Blacksher and Lani Guinier assert that the equal sovereignty 
principle has a “racially discriminatory pedigree” because its origins “can 
be traced back to the Court’s infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford” 
and Prigg v. Pennsylvania.279  Joseph Fishkin similarly argues that the 
equal sovereignty principle should be rejected because it “inscribe[s] into 
the Constitution some of the core constitutional claims, unsuccessful even 
in their own time, of the defeated Confederacy and its apologists.”280  
Although appeals to state sovereignty have undeniably been used to pursue 
racist goals, Shelby County’s critics have again exaggerated their claims.281 
The equal sovereignty principle is far older than the Court’s slavery 
jurisprudence. As demonstrated above, the idea that the states have an equal 
claim to sovereignty is as old as the Union.  Throughout the antebellum 
period, this idea was held, not just by defenders of slavery, but also by 
nationalists such as Hamilton, Marshall, Webster, and Lincoln.  In fact, the 
very Republicans who pushed the Reconstruction Amendments through 
Congress held similar beliefs.282 
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The Taney Court’s slavery jurisprudence, moreover, is completely 
unrelated to the equal sovereignty principle. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the 
Supreme Court held that the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution 
granted slave owners a right to recover their fugitive slaves without any 
interference from state laws designed to protect free blacks from 
kidnapping.283  As Justice McLean argued in dissent, the Court’s decision 
actually undermined “the inherent and sovereign power of a [free] state, to 
protect its jurisdiction and the peace of its citizens.”284  Rather than rely on 
equal sovereignty, Prigg nationalized a proslavery interpretation of the 
Fugitive Slave Clause and undermined state sovereignty by prohibiting 
northern states from protecting free blacks from kidnapping.285 
The equal sovereignty principle also cannot be blamed for the Court’s 
infamous decision in Dred Scott.286  The Court in Dred Scott held that 
blacks could not be United States citizens and that Congress could not ban 
slavery in the federal territories.287  Chief Justice Taney reasoned that 
because the federal territories were held for the “equal benefit” of the states, 
congressional discrimination against property in slaves would violate the 
Due Process Clause.288 As Justices McLean and Curtis argued in dissent, 
the Court’s argument assumed that slavery—previously viewed as a matter 
of local law—extended into the federal territories of its own force.289  The 
                                                                                                                 
authority for the states.  Scholars such as Fishkin are reading the New Deal constitutional 
settlement back into Reconstruction. 
 283. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).  The Court therefore held that Pennsylvania’s personal 
liberty law, which required slave catchers to bring fugitives before a judicial officer before 
removing them from the state, was unconstitutional and reversed Prigg’s conviction under 
the law.  Id.  The Court further held that the fugitive clause granted Congress the power to 
pass the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.  Id. at 541. 
 284. Id. at 673.  Judge Abraham D. Smith of the Wisconsin Supreme Court asserted that 
Prigg caused "[t]he slave code of every State in the Union [to be] engrafted upon the laws of 
every free State." In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 122 (1854).  He further stated that, under Prigg, 
"The rights, interests, feelings, dignity, sovereignty, of the free States are as nothing, while 
the mere pecuniary interests of the slaveholder are everything."  Id. at 131. 
 285. See H. ROBERT BAKER, PRIGG V. PENNSYLVANIA: SLAVERY, THE SUPREME COURT, 
AND THE AMBIVALENT CONSTITUTION 63 (2012); Paul Finkleman, Sorting Out Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 630 (1993); Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Immigration 
Enforcement Reform: Learning from the History of Fugitive Slave Rendition, 103 GEO. L.J. 
ONLINE 1, 1-4 (2014), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2014/05/Schmitt.Immigration 
Enforcement1.pdf; Jeffrey M. Schmitt, The Antislavery Judge Reconsidered, 29 L. & HIST. 
REV. 797, 799 (2011). 
 286. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).   
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 448. 
 289. Id. at 548-49, 626-27 (McClean, J., dissenting) (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
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Court, therefore, nationalized slavery by elevating the sovereignty of the 
Southern states over that of the Northern states that had rejected slavery in 
favor of free labor.290  After Justice Taney determined that property in 
slaves existed in the federal territories, he then relied on a principle of equal 
treatment—not equal sovereignty—to find that Congress could not 
discriminate against the law of slavery.291  In sum, Dred Scott relied on a 
nationalization of slavery—and thus a limitation on the sovereignty of the 
northern states—rather than the equal sovereignty principle. 
Not only did the Taney Court’s slavery jurisprudence promote national 
power at the expense of state sovereignty, but it also repudiated antislavery 
use of state sovereignty arguments.  During the antislavery furor brought 
about by the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was unconstitutional and developed a 
radical doctrine of states’ rights to shield its decision from federal 
review.292  Using the traditionally Southern compact theory of the Union, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court argued that, because the federal government 
was the mere “creature” of the sovereign states,293 the states could render a 
final determination of the powers delegated under the Constitution.294  After 
the court’s decision, the states’ rights issue dominated local politics in 
Wisconsin and helped propel the antislavery Republican Party to power.295  
In Ableman v. Booth, Chief Justice Taney upheld the constitutionality of the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and thoroughly repudiated the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s doctrine of states’ rights.296  Rather than rely on equal 
state sovereignty, Chief Justice Taney’s opinion was a nationalist 
                                                                                                                 
 290. Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Constitutional Limitations on Extraterritorial State Power: 
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exposition of federal judicial power that could easily have been written by 
Joseph Story or John Marshall. 
The Wisconsin episode not only demonstrates that the equal sovereignty 
principle was unconnected to the Taney Court’s slavery jurisprudence, but, 
like PASPA and the CAA, it also shows that arguments from state 
sovereignty are not inherently racist, immoral, or otherwise undesirable.  I 
have elsewhere argued that principles of state sovereignty support recent 
California legislation that provides progressive standards for animal welfare 
and carbon emissions.297  Although state sovereignty was admittedly used 
as a basis for the secession of the Confederate states and a justification for 
Jim Crow, the constitutional idea of divided sovereignty is not inherently 
racist or undesirable.  Instead, as the Wisconsin and California 
counterexamples demonstrate, state sovereignty provides a way for states to 
charter a course that differs from that of the federal government.  Whether 
that course is a just one depends on the desirability of federal policy more 
than anything inherent in the doctrine of state sovereignty. 
Conclusion 
According to legal scholars, Shelby County’s principle of equal 
sovereignty is indefensible.  The doctrine, academics contend, is 
theoretically unworkable, undermines individual rights, has no basis in 
constitutional doctrine, is inconsistent with constitutional history, and is 
tainted by its racist origins.  Perhaps because the Court used the principle to 
strike down a pillar of the Civil Rights Movement and enable Southern 
states to pass new voter suppression laws, scholarly criticism has been both 
scathing and unanimous. 
Once the equal sovereignty principle is properly understood, however, 
these criticisms miss their mark.  The equal sovereignty principle does not 
require Congress to treat the states equally; instead, it applies only when 
Congress limits the sovereign power of the states in an unequal manner.  In 
part because this principle dovetails with the Court’s other federalism 
jurisprudence, it imposes a relatively mild limit on congressional power.  
And, although equal state sovereignty is not commanded by the text or the 
Court’s precedent, it is fully consistent with, and arguably even supported 
by, these traditional legal sources.  Equal sovereignty is also neutral from a 
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policy standpoint—it merely protects the power of the states to enact 
policies that differ from those of the federal government. 
Despite widespread assertions to the contrary, perhaps the strongest 
argument in favor of equal sovereignty is based on history.  The basic 
structure of the Constitution, as explained by the framers and nationalist 
leaders at every level of the antebellum federal government, implies the 
equal sovereignty of the states.  Instead of destroying this basic structure, 
the Reconstruction Amendments and New Deal expanded federal power 
within the tradition of divided sovereignty between the states and the 
federal government.  The equal sovereignty of the states has therefore been 
a basic structural assumption throughout our constitutional history.  
Through its federalism jurisprudence of the last several decades, the 
Supreme Court has regularly transformed such structural principles into 
enforceable constitutional doctrine.  The sometimes hyperbolic academic 
criticism of the equal sovereignty principle seems out of place once the case 
is properly situated within its historical context. 
The real problem with Shelby County is not the content of the equal 
sovereignty principle but rather the manner in which the Court applied the 
doctrine.  The record provided the Court with a clear basis to find that the 
VRA’s unequal effects on state sovereignty were sufficiently related to the 
modern reality of racial discrimination in the covered jurisdictions.  Much 
like many other controversial cases, the Court used ambiguous law to reach 
an unnecessary result. 
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